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REVIEW ESSAY
CHARTING THE BICENTENNIAL
Richard B. Bernstein*
Our recent national anniversaries have had a dual or, more accurately, a fragmented character. They are convenient way stations for
the scholarly community to evaluate prevailing currents in American
scholarship, and to indicate new directions for research. At the same
time, they are occasions for the general public to celebrate pivotal moments in American history and reaffirm enduring American values.
Although these two enterprises need not come into conflict, they often
do. As a result, we regularly lose valuable opportunities to build
bridges-that is, to inform the general public's understanding of what
they are celebrating by reference to the work of the scholarly
community.
The bicentennial of the United States Constitution has suffered
from this internal contradiction, despite the efforts of organizations
such as Project '87 (sponsored by the American Historical Association
and the American Political Science Association) and research institutions such as the Library of Congress, The New York Public Library,
Columbia University, and the New-York Historical Society, as well as
the recent work of individual scholars. Such scholarly efforts are collectively the exception rather than the rule. More representative of the
* Historical Consultant, New York City Commission on the Bicentennial of the
Constitution; Co-Curator, Constitution Bicentennial Project, The New York Public Library (1984-87); doctoral candidate in history, New York University. B.A., Amherst
College, 1977;J.D., Harvard Law School, 1980. Author (with Kym S. Rice), Are We To
Be A Nation? The Making of the Constitution (1987); Editor, Defending the Constitution (1987).
Kym S. Rice, Professor Gordon S. Wood, Professor Thomas C. Mackey, Seth Agata,
D. Graham Combs, Maureen K. Phillips, and Edward Rime provided invaluable advice
and comments on this Review Essay and on matters it discusses. Special thanks are due
to Professors William E. Nelson, John Phillip Reid, and John E. Sexton of New York
University School of Law, and to the NYU Legal History Colloquium. I particularly want
to acknowledge the contributions and assistance of Barbara Wilcie Kern, who suggested
the title of this Article and subjected it to rigorous line-by-line editing in the interests of
clear writing and thinking. I also am grateful to Peter S. Kohlmann, Executive Director
of the New York City Commission on the Bicentennial of the Constitution, for his encouragement and support.
The views expressed in this Review Essay are those of the writer and should not in
any way be taken as an expression of the views of either the New York City Commission
on the Bicentennial or The New York Public Library.
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depth and accuracy of discourse about the Constitution generated by
the Bicentennial is the foreword by former Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger to the "official" Bicentennial edition of the U.S. Constitution:
In the last quarter of the 18th Century, there was no country
in the world that governed with separated and divided powers
providing checks and balances on the exercise of authority by
those who governed. A first step toward such a result was
taken with the Declaration of Independence in 1776, which
was followed by the Constitution drafted in Philadelphia in
1787; and in 1791 the Bill of Rights was added. Each had
antecedents back to Magna Carta and beyond.
The work of 55 men at Philadelphia in 1787 marked the
beginning of the end of the concept of the divine right of
kings. In place of the absolutism of monarchy, the freedoms
flowing from this document created a land of opportunities.
Ever since then discouraged and oppressed people from every
part of the world have made a beaten path to our shores. This
is the meaning of our Constitution.
... The

principal goal of the National Commission is to

stimulate an appreciation and understanding of our national
heritage-a history and civics lesson for all of us. This lesson
cannot be learned without first reading and grasping the
meaning of this document-the first of its kind in all human
history. I
Appearing as it does over the signature of the former ChiefJustice
of the United States, this Foreword is clothed with great ostensible authority. Closer examination reveals that it is riddled with errors of fact
and questionable interpretations that exaggerate the Constitution's
uniqueness, distort its origins and significance, and paper over its
shortcomings and those of American history in general. For example:
To declare that the Constitution was "the first [document] of its kind in
all human history" slights the entire record of colonial and Revolutionary efforts to forge an American union culminating in the Articles of
Confederation, and of state constitution-making in the 1770s and
1780s that contributed to the development of American ideas of consti2
tutional government and specified features of the Constitution.
To claim that "the work of 55 men at Philadelphia in 1787 marked
1. ,Burger, Foreword to Constitution of the United States of America; (rev. ed.
1987).
2. On state constitution-making, see W. Adams, The First American Constitutions

(1980); D. Lutz, Popular Consent and Popular Control (1980); R. Bernstein with K.
Rice, Are We To Be A Nation? The Making of the Constitution 44-64 (1987). On prerevolutionary unions, see H. Ward, The United Colonies of New England, 1643-90
(1961); H. Ward, "Unite or Die": Intercolony Relations, 1690-1763 (1971); R.
Newbold, The Albany Congress and Plan of Union of 1754 (1955); see also R. Bernstein
with K. Rice, supra, 11-16. On the Articles of Confederation, see M.Jensen, The Articles of Confederation (1940); J. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics 143-91
(1979); R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra, 16-42.
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the beginning of the end of the concept of the divine right of kings"
ignores more than a century of English constitutional history, including
the Civil War and Commonwealth and the Glorious Revolutionevents and controversy that profoundly shaped the3 political perceptions of the Revolutionary generation of Americans.
To construct a chain of events pointing to the establishment of a
government with "separated and divided powers providing checks and
balances on the exercise of authority by those who governed" that includes the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights incorrectly implies that these documents directly contributed to the
development of ideas of separation of powers and checks and balances,
and mistakenly implies that this result was the sole significance of the
Revolution and the framing and adoption of the Constitution.
To extol "the land of opportunities" created by "the freedoms
flowing from" the Constitution disregards the Framers' compromises
protecting slavery, 4 the nation's history of immigration restrictions, 5
breaches of treaties with Native Americans, 6 and the slowness and difficulty of the campaign for recognition of equal rights for American
7
women.
To imply that the Constitution is the sole source of our national
successes discounts other causes such as the abundance of our natural
resources, the diversity of the American population, and our geographic insulation for much of our history from the problems and convulsions of the Old World.8 Unfortunately, the Chief Justice's
Foreword typifies most of the accounts of our Constitution's origins
and significance aimed at most Americans in the Bicentennial period.
The record of the Bicentennial confirms the existence of wideand widening-gaps between the concerns of the historical profession,
the priorities of the legal community, and the interests of the general
public and those who write for them. This pattern of fragmentation has
3. See generallyJ. Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution (2 vols.
to date, 1987); B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 198-201
(1967); G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 10-18 (1969);
D. Lovejoy, The Glorious Revolution in America (1972); H. Colbourn, The Lamp of
Experience (1965); C. Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealth Man 342-43
(1958); C. Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic (1953); R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra
note 2, at 118-20.
4. A. Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process-The Colonial Period (1978); R. Kluger, Simple Justice (1975); W. Jordan, White
Over Black (1968); D. Robinson, Slavery in the Structure of American Politics,
1765-1820, at 168-247 (1971).
5. See generally 0. Handlin, The Uprooted (rev. ed. 1971); J. Higham, Strangers
in the Land (1981); D. Reimers, Still the Golden Door (1985).
6. See generally F. Prucha, The Great Father (2 vols. 1984).
7. See generally C. Degler, At Odds (1980); S.Lebsock with K. Rice, "A Share of
Honor": Virginia Women 1600-1940 (1984); L. Kerber, Women of the Republic (1980).
8. See, e.g., R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 1-10; D. Potter, People of
Plenty (1954).
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disturbing implications for the kinds of issues and research projects
that historians of the Founding Period and the origins of the Constitution pursue. Another question emerges at a deeper level: Does it matter whether those outside the historical community read and use
accurate and reliable historical information and balanced understandings of the past? To elucidate the dimensions, seriousness, and consequences of the fragmentation of the Bicentennial, this Essay surveys
recent publications on the Founding Period and the making of the
Constitution.9
Part I describes the latest products of the scholarly community's
growing concern with preserving the evidence of the past-the "documentary editing" projects for the records of the Federal Convention,
the ratification of the Constitution, the first federal elections, the First
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the papers of individual statesmen.
Part II examines several of the most important recent studies of the
Founding Period to illustrate the range and depth of the new historical
scholarship in this field. Part II also describes a growing schism in constitutional history. This schism divides those scholars who conscript
evidence of the past in the service of one or another position in modern
public controversy, applying purely utilitarian standards to the definition of research problems and the selection and presentation of evidence, from those scholars who seek to understand the past on its own
terms and maintain a respect for its integrity even when they invoke the
past to support present-day interpretative arguments.
Part III assesses the principal recent books on the Constitution's
origins for a general rather than a scholarly audience, measuring these
writers' success or failure in making the findings and interpretations of
historical specialists available to the general reader.
Part IV focuses on Michael Kammen's A Mliachine That Would Go of
Itself.1 0 Professor Kammen's study of the Constitution's place in popular thought and culture suggests that the present fragmentation of the
9. This Article discusses only those Bicentennial-related publications focusing on
the Founding Period or whose arguments are rooted in the Founding Period. I have
therefore not discussed the following significant publications in this Article: A. Cox,
The Court and the Constitution (1987); W. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It
Was, How It Is (1987); R. Peck, We the People: The Constitution in American Life

(1987);J. Lieberman, The Enduring Constitution (1987); A Workable Government? (B.
Marshall ed., 1987); The Blessings of Liberty (R. Peck & R. Pollock eds. 1987).

The following articles are useful and guides to Bicentennial literature and other
projects: McKay, A Vast Array Commemorates Constitution's Bicentennial, N.Y.LJ.,
Sept. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 3-4, at 2, col. 1-6, at 6, col. 5-6; Morgan, Constitutional Fic-

tions, The New Republic,June 29, 1987, at 25-36. ProfessorJack P. Greene has written
a historiographical essay under the auspices of Friends of Independence National Historical Park,J. Greene, A Bicentennial Bookshelf: Historians Analyze the Constitutional
Era (1986), and will also write an addendum covering "primary publications through tie

bicentennial year, 1987." Id. at 5.
10. M. Kammen, A Machine that Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American
Culture (1986).
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Bicentennial is nothing new, but rather the latest stage of the American
people's uncomprehending celebration of the Constitution and the values it is supposed to embody.
The Conclusion argues that the fragmentation characterizing the
Bicentennial is different not merely in degree but in kind from the phenomena Kammen describes. It suggests that those Bicentennial publications seeking to preserve our shared constitutional discourse deserve
the highest praise precisely because they preserve the major precondition for the success of American constitutionalism and selfgovernment.
I.

RECOVERING THE RECORD OF THE PAST

During the past century, historical and legal scholarship have
benefitted from major efforts to gather, edit, and publish the papers of
key statesmen from all periods of American history, and in particular
from the era of the nation's founding. Largely the work of individual
scholars in the years before World War II, these documentary editing
projects have flourished in the past four decades under the sponsorship of major academic and research institutions and the National Historical Records and Publications Commission, and their labors have
transformed the study of the Founding Period.
A. Multivolume Compilations
It is impossible to imagine modern editions of historical documents-or the study of the origins of the Constitution-without Max
Farrand's Records of the Federal Convention of 1787.11 Farrand's compilation of the extant notes of debates in the Convention and supplementary documents has set the model for all later editions of historical
documents or "statesmen's papers." Farrand published the first three
volumes of the Records in 1911, and issued a supplementary volume in
1937 for the Constitution's sesquicentennial-but this fourth volume
was confusingly organized and did not include many significant documents having to do with the Federal Convention.
For decades, we have been promised an updated edition of Farrand incorporating this newly discovered material. James H. Hutson,
Chief of Manuscripts of the Library of Congress, has published a revised and greatly expanded edition of Farrand's original fourth volume
in a fitting commemoration of the Bicentennial. 12 This new Supplement
reorganizes systematically the materials contained in Farrand's original
fourth volume. It also incorporates such important materials as New
York delegate John Lansing's journal of the Federal Convention (origi11. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) (orig.
ed. 1911).
12. Supplement to Max Farrand's The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787

U. Hutson ed.

1987) [hereinafter Supplement].
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nally published in 1939);13 fragmentary Convention notes and later reminiscences byJohn Dickinson, Gunning Bedford, Charles C. Pinckney,
William Samuel Johnson, Pierce Butler, and other Convention delegates; and even an appendix of weather records dealing with the period
of the Federal Convention. The contents are well presented, arranged
by date to correspond with the organization of the two main volumes of
the Records, and edited with scrupulous accuracy. In addition, the Supplement reprints the original 1937 index, updated to include references
to the new volume.
The scholarly achievement represented by Dr. Hutson's Supplement
is admirable. A few minor errors crept into the book, however, as is
inevitable with any enterprise of this magnitude. For example, Dr. Hutson's treatment of Pennsylvania delegate Thomas Fitzsimons's letter to
Noah Webster dated 15 September 1787' 4 is curiously incomplete. He
reprints only the first part of this letter, which provides some evidence
as to what the Convention was doing in its closing days. But he unaccountably breaks off the text of the letter a bit more than halfway
through (though clearly indicating by use of ellipses that he has done
so). The omitted portion of Fitzsimons's letter is, perhaps, even more
important than the published part, for in it Fitzsimons solicited Webster's support for the Constitution two days before the end of the Convention, seeking to enlist the twenty-nine-year-old lexicographer and
publicist in the impending pamphlet wars. This passage exacerbates
Fitzsimons's arguable breach of the rule of secrecy binding the Convention's delegates. 15 It is also unfortunate that Hutson's Preface does not
present the developed conclusions on "the integrity of the documentary record" that he has published elsewhere. 16
Hutson concedes that the materials presented in this revised and
expanded Supplement may not compel a major reconceptualization of
the framing of the Constitution, but they do add significantly to our
understanding of the Federal Convention. And the resulting republication of the first three volumes of Farrand's Records once more places the
single most important compilation of sources for studying the origins
of the Constitution before the public.
Hutson's Supplement is but one of the major documentary publication projects focusing on the Founding Period. For example, John P.
Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino, and Richard Leffler have continued the
late Merrill Jensen's Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitu13. J. Lansing, The Delegate From New York (J. Strayer ed. 1939).
14. Letter of Thomas Fitzsimons to Noah Webster, 15 Sept. 1787, Noah Webster
Papers, Box 2, Rare Books and Manuscripts Division, The New York Public Library,
reprinted in part from a transcript at Yale University in Supplement, supra note 12 at
273. Hutson does not refer to the original manuscript of this letter.
15. On the rule of secrecy, see R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 154-55.
16. See infra notes 217-31 and accompanying text.
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tion and the Bill of Rights, 1 7 a major undertaking that will replace the fragmentary, unreliable edition of the ratification debates prepared in the
nineteenth century by Jonathan Elliot.' 8 Kaminski, Saladino, and Leffier have organized their volumes into two series. The first reconstructs
to the extent possible the votes and debates in the several state ratifying
conventions; the second assembles in chronological order the public
dialogue-in news reports and squibs, newspaper and periodical essays, and pamphlets-and private correspondence of supporters and
opponents of the Constitution. The texts are accurate and reliable, and
the annotations are careful and complete without overwhelming the
primary source materials they are intended to supplement. When this
project is completed, it will be an unparalleled resource for future
scholars studying the ratification of the Constitution as "the first national political campaign"' 19 or as a sophisticated and wide-ranging argument over political theory and practice.
Until the Documentary History of the Ratification is complete, those interested in the polemical literature against the Constitution can turn to
the late Herbert J. Storing's The Complete Anti-Federalist,20 the fullest
modern edition of major and minor pamphlets, newspaper essays, and
broadsides by the opponents of the Constitution. Storing's great project, which appeared posthumously due to the devoted efforts of Murray
Dry and the commitment of the University of Chicago Press, has reshaped our understanding of the Anti-Federalists' arguments against
the Constitution and enhances our sense of their enduring significance.
Storing's first volume, reprinted separately as What the Anti-Federalists
Were For,2 1 is the single best analysis of Anti-Federal thought.
We also have three of the four projected volumes of The Documentary History of the First Federal Elections,2 2 prepared by the late Merrill
Jensen and Gordon DenBoer, and the first installment of a projected
seven volume Documentary History of the Supreme Court,23 edited by Maeva
Marcus and James T. Perry. Most important of all, under the leadership of Charlene Bickford, are the first six volumes of the Documentary
History of the First Federal Congress,24 including new, definitive editions of
17. The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights (M.Jensen, J. Kaminski, G. Saladino & R. Leffler eds., 7 vols. to date, 1976-86).
18. The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 (J.

Elliott ed. 1827, 1828 & 1830).
19. R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 199.
20. H. Storing with M. Dry, The Complete Anti-Federalist (1981) (seven volumes in

all).
21. H. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For (1981).
22. The Documentary History of the First Federal Elections (M. Jensen & G.
DenBoer eds., 3 vols. to date 1976-86).
23. 1 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States,
1789-1800 (M. Marcus &J. Perry eds., 1 vol. to date 1985).
24. Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, 1789-1791 (L. DePauw, C.
Bickford & H. Veit eds., 6 vols. to date 1972-86). Eighteen volumes are projected.
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the Senate Legislative and Executive Journals, the Journal of the House
of Representatives, and three volumes of "Legislative Histories."
These last volumes are a treasure trove for students of early American
politics and legislative practice; they calendar and reprint the full texts
of all bills and resolutions introduced in the House and Senate, all extant committee reports and drafts of legislation, and the final texts of all
bills, resolutions, and other documents emanating from the First Congress. Among the measures benefiting from this detailed attention are
the Judiciary Act of 178925 and the proposed constitutional amendments (including the Bill of Rights).26 Future volumes of the Documentary History of the FirstFederalCongress will include a reliable edition of the
diary of Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania (even in its present
bowdlerized form a priceless primary source for early American politics), 27 surviving notes of debates by other members of the House and
Senate, the extant correspondence of all members of the First Congress
and all published records of the debates of the House of Representatives-this last of particular importance, as it will enable us to supplant
28 a text harshly critithe debates as reprinted in the Annals of Congress,
29
inaccuracy.
and
cized for its incompleteness
In addition to these major documentary histories, the "statemen's
papers" projects-including editions of the papers of Benjamin
Franklin, 30 George Washington, 3 1 John Adams, 3 2 Thomas Jefferson, 33
37
John Jay,3 4 James Madison, 3 5 John Marshall,3 6 and Robert Morris 25. See 5 id. at 1150-1212 (1986).
26. See 4 id. at 1-48 (1986).
27. TheJournal of William Maclay (C. Beard ed. 1927).
28. Annals of Congress U. Gales & W. Seaton eds. 1834).
29. See infra notes 230-231 and accompanying text.
30. The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (L. Labaree, H. Boatfield, W. Bell & H.
Fineman eds., 26 vols. to date 1959-87).
31. The Washington Papers are planned to appear in several different seriesColonial Series (W. Abbot, D. Twohig, P. Chase, B. Bunge & F. Schmidt eds., 4 vols. to
date 1983-84); Revolutionary War Series (W. Abbot, D. Twohig, P. Chase, B. Bunge &
F. Schmidt eds, 2 vols. to date 1985-87); Presidential Series (W. Abbot & D. Twohig
eds., 2 vols. to date 1987).
32. The Adams Papers are also at present planned to appear in several different
series-Series I, Diaries and Autobiographies, including The Diary and Autobiography
ofJohn Adams (L. Butterfield ed., 4 vols. 1961) and the Earliest Diary ofJohn Adams (L.
Butterfield ed. 1966); Series II, Family Correspondence; Series III, Special Series, including The Legal Papers ofJohn Adams (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds., 3 vols. 1965); and
Series IV, Political Correspondence and Related Papers, including The Papers ofJohn
Adams (R. Taylor, M. Kline & G. Lont eds., 6 vols. to date, 1977-83).
33. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson U. Boyd & C. Sellers eds., 22 vols. to date
1950-86).
34. JohnJay: Unpublished Papers (R. Morris ed., 2 vols. to date 1975-80).
35. The Papers ofJames Madison (W. Hutchinson, W. Rachal & R. Rutland eds., 16
vols. to date 1962-87).
36. The Papers ofJohn Marshall (C. Hobson, F. Teute, G. Hoeman & I. Hillinger
eds., 5 vols. to date 1974-87).
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move forward. We already have Robert A. Rutland's superb edition of
The Papers of George Mason.38 Another completed edition, The Papers of
Alexander Hamilton, has published a supplement incorporating materials
omitted from previous volumes and including a comprehensive index.3 9 The Madison and Jefferson projects have progressed beyond
the end of the First Congress on 4 March 1791, and the final two
volumes of The Papers ofJohnJay, covering his political career from 1784
to 1801 and his retirement years (1801-1829), are well advanced and
should appear before the end of the decade. Although they receive oc40
casional criticism for being too ambitious to be completed, these documentary editing projects perform invaluable services by cataloguing
and encouraging preservation of original manuscript sources, training
scholars in historical editing and the uses of historial evidence, and
making otherwise inaccessible manuscript materials available to scholars across the nation and throughout the world.
B. One-Volume Compilations
Several new and three older one-volume compliations of materials
concerning the framing and adoption of the Constitution, clearly
targeted for use in secondary school, college, and graduate courses,
have appeared for the Bicentennial. Even the least satisfactory of these
collections signals the intellectual enrichment of teaching the origins of
the Constitution. Professors and teachers can now draw on and communicate the intellectual range and depth of the Founding Period and,
in particular, the debates over the Constitution, due in large part to the
work of the editors of the "documentary histories" and "statesmen's
papers" projects described above.
The best new one-volume collection is Michael Kammen's The Origins of the American Constitution.4 1 Professor Kammen's book is the only
modern compilation to consider the making of the Constitution as a
process reaching back before the Federal Convention and stretching
beyond ratification to include the reshaping of American politics within
the matrix of the Constitution in the early 1790s. His choice of materials-drawing on private correspondence of leading American politicians such as Washington, Hamilton, and Madison, key public
documents, and the best writings for and against the Constitution-is
sound and well considered. He presents complete texts, sparingly but
37. The Papers of Robert Morris, 1781-1784 (E. Ferguson &J. Catanzariti eds., 6

vols. to date 1973-84).
38. The Papers of George Mason (R. Rutland ed., 3 vols. 1970).
39. 27 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (B. Chernow ed. 1987) (supplementing
The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (H. Syrett ed., 26 vols. 1961-79)).
40. See, e.g., Levy, Editing the Framer, in L. Levy, Judgments: Essays on American
Constitutional History 106 (1972).
41. The Origins of the American Constitution (M. Kammen ed. 1986).
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judiciously annotated, with informative head notes. And his introductory essay is a lucid overview of the period.
None of the other new volumes is as useful or as comprehensive as
Origins. They emphasize the Anti-Federalists' writings in the apparent
hope of achieving classroom status as complements to The Federalist.
Murray Dry has prepared a one-volume abridgment of The CompleteAntiFederalistunder the title The Anti-Federalist.4 2 Cecelia Kenyon's The Antifederalists has reappeared, with a new introduction by Gordon S.
Wood.4 3 Ralph Ketcham has prepared a compilation including extracts
from James Madison's "Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of
1787" and a traditional sampling of Anti-Federalist writings. 44 These
books are interchangeable, though TheAnti-Federalistoffers a slight edge
in the number and quality of Anti-Federal tracts it reprints.
J.R. Pole's The American Constitution: For and Against 4 5 presents a
comparable selection of Anti-Federal writings side-by-side with a heavily abridged sampling of The Federalist. Although Professor Pole's introduction is a fine brief essay for the student on the period of the
Constitution's origins, his handling of The Federalist is incomprehensible. Unlike Professor Kammen's volume, which reprints complete texts
of the twenty-one best essays (probably by reference to the late Clinton
Rossiter's authoritative list),4 6 The American Constitution: For and Against

presents an outline table of contents of the eighty-five essays, sprinkled
here and there with extracts of varying lengths and, only rarely, the full
texts of some essays. Those wishing to use only one documentary collection in the classroom would be well advised to select Professor Kammen's as the best all-around volume.
Two shortcomings plague even the best of these one-volume collections. By referring to "The Anti-Federalist Papers" in obvious echo
of The Federalist, these books suggest an illusory unity and coherence in
their contents. There were no "Anti-Federalist Papers." The only
Anti-Federal work that could compare in scope with The Federalistis the
collected Letters from the FederalFarmer to the Republican,4 7 and even one
of its warmest advocates has conceded, in his excellent modern edition,
that it is not as impressive a theoretical and polemical performance as
The Federalist.4 8 Moreover, there was no centerpiece of Anti-Federal
writings equivalent to the role that The Federalistassumed for supporters
of the Constitution. Cecelia Kenyon's collection has handled the mat42. The Anti-Federalist (M. Dry ed. 1985).
43. C. Kenyon, The Antifederalists (2d ed. 1983).
44. The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates (R.
Ketcham ed. 1986) (Hereinafter R. Ketcham].
45. The American Constitution: For and Against U. Pole ed. 1987).
46. The Federalist Papers xxi (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

47. Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (W. Bennett ed. 1978).
48. Id. at xxxiv.
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ter correctly, using the title The Antifederalists to convey the multifarious

character of the opposition to the Constitution.
These compilations also fall short in their implicit assumption that

The Federalist is the only pro-Constitution polemic worthy of study.
Only Ralph Ketcham chooses to reprint a pro-Constitution work other
than The Federalist-oneofJames Wilson's speeches to the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention 4 9-and only because so many Anti-Federal writers
responded directly to it.50 Several important pro-Constitution pamphlets do deserve a modem audience. These include John Jay's Address
to the People of the State of New-York 5l-perhaps the most popular proConstitution pamphlet-and Noah Webster's Examination into the Leading Principlesof the Constitution.52 These writings are at present available
only in expensive, hard-to-find reprints of Paul Ford's volumes of a
century ago. 5 3 Although all of these materials have appeared or will
appear in the Documentary History of the Ratification,54 the finest of them
should be reprinted in more accessible form. 55 Indeed, as Hamilton's
FederalistNo. 85 cites Jay's Address approvingly 56 and as this essay represents Jay's fullest development of arguments that illness prevented him
from making as Publius, it would be appropriate for future editors of
The Federalist to include Jay's Address in an appendix.
Readers should also take note of another reissued anthology with a
different purpose from the compilations discussed above. Richard B.
Morris' Basic Documents on the Confederationand the Constitution57 originally
appeared in 1970. This excellent book gathers well-known documents
such as the Articles of Confederation and the Treaty of Paris of 1783,
reprinting them together with usefully edited and introduced extracts
from rare works such as Lord Sheffield's Observations on the Commerce of
the American States and newspaper accounts of uprisings in Vermont contemporaneous with Shays's Rebellion. Professor Morris puts these
readings in larger perspective in an introductory essay that is a fine
49. James Wilson, Speech at Pennsylvania State House (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in
The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates, supra note 44,
at 183-88.
50. Introduction to The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention
Debates, supra note 44, at 22.
51. [J. Jay], An Address to the People of the State of New York, on the Subject of
the Constitution ...

(New York 1788).

52. [N. Webster], An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution Proposed by the Late Convention... (Philadelphia 1787).
53. Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States (P. Ford ed. 1888); Essays
on the Constitution of the United States (P. Ford ed. 1889). But see Defending the
Constitution (R. Bernstein ed. 1987).
54. See supra note 17.
55. In addition, Professor Bernard Bailyn is preparing a volume entitled The Debate over the Constitution for publication by the Library of America in 1989.
56. The Federalist, No. 85 (A. Hamilton).
57. Basic Documents on the Confederation and Constitution (R. Morris ed. 1985)
(orig. ed. 1970).
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brief account of the Confederation period by its leading modern
historian.
With great fanfare, Penguin Books has produced a new edition of
The FederalistPapers, prepared by Professor Isaac Kramnick of Cornell
University, as part of its authoritative Penguin Classics series.5 8 This
new version is a prodigious disappointment, although it has a few features to recommend it, including its republication of Hamilton's preface to the original McLean edition of 1788. 5 9 The troubles begin on
the cover, which lists Madison as senior author even though Hamilton
conceived the project and wrote nearly two-thirds of the essays; perhaps this is a reflection of the prevailing scholarly preoccupation with
Madison's Federalist 10 and 51. The back cover speaks of a hitherto unknown creature called the "Constitutional Congress," dubs The Federalist "[t]he definitive exposition of the American Constitution" (a claim
that none of its authors made for it), and declares, despite the reshaping of constitutional federalism by the fourteenth amendment, that
"the Constitution ... has proved resilient enough to survive, almost

unchanged, for two hundred years."' 60 The brief biographies of the authors are riddled with errors, including its dating of Madison's disestablishment campaign as taking place during his Presidency (1809-1817)
rather than three decades before, its declaration that Hamilton "held
the casting vote against Burr and forJefferson in 1801" (his actual role,
though critical to Jefferson's success in 1801, was not so direct), and its
claim that Jay harbored dreams of succeeding Washington as President. 6 ' The text of the Constitution included as an appendix lacks the

twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth amendments. The introductory essay by
Professor Kramnick is an odd mixture of suggestive ideas-such as his
argument that the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776, usually thought
to be unicameral, was in fact bicameral, with the great body of the people serving as the lower house of a two-house legislature 62-and outdated information and careless citation. Often, Professor Kramnick
paints with far too sweeping a brush. His discussion of the state constitutions, for example, lumps them together as enshrining legislative
supremacy and crippling the institution of the governor by depriving it
of any independent power or role in the legislative process,6 - leaving
out all mention of the New York and Massachusetts constitutions,
which directly contradict his argument. 6 4 Similarly, he argues that the
58. J. Madison, A. Hamilton &J. Jay, The Federalist Papers (I. Kramnick ed. 1987)
[hereinafter Federalist (Kramnick)].
59. Id. at 85.
60. Id., back cover.
61. Id. at 1.

62. Id. at 22.
63. Id. at 21.
64. R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 44-64, esp. 51 (on J. Adams,
Thoughts on Government [Boston 1776]), 56-64 (on New York Constitution of 1777
and Massachusetts Constitution of 1780).
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Confederation Congress had only one house because the "spirit of '76"

would not have admitted an "aristocratic" second body 6 5 -forgetting
that, even in the days of deferential colonial politics, all plans for intercolonial union, either in opposition to the French and Indians or to
British oppression, had but one house, and that mostly as a matter of
historical accident that became habitual up to the Federal Convention. 66 Equally puzzling is his declaration that "the events which led to
67
the Constitutional Convention took place totally within the states";
how can this be, when the state governments were hostile to efforts to
strengthen the Articles of Confederation? Rather, the effort to
strengthen and ultimately to replace the Articles was the work of individuals operating almost entirely outside the established channels of
federal and state politics, who replicated the patterns of organization
and communication that led to the Revolution. 6 8 In short, Professor
Kramnick's account of the context, arguments, and origins of The Federalist, while at times provocative, is neither reliable nor accurate.
Clearly intended for use as a classroom text, the Penguin Federalist
should not replace the now-classic edition prepared in 1961 by the late
Clinton Rossiter. Indeed, the most evocative text on the back cover of
the Penguin Federalist is quoted from Rossiter's introduction to the
Mentor Federalist.69 The great pity is this edition of The Federalist casts
grave doubt on the great, and hitherto deserved, reputation of the Penguin Classics series for accuracy and reliability.
C. Reference Works
We conclude this survey of works intended to recover and make
accessible the records of the Founding Period with two vast, collabora70
tive reference projects-the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution
and The Founders' Constitution.7 1 The Encyclopedia, the brainchild of Professor Leonard W. Levy of the Claremont Graduate School and edited
by him with Professors Kenneth W. Karst and Dennis J. Mahoney,
brings together over 200 constitutional scholars 7 2 who have prepared
hundreds of articles on a remarkable variety of concepts, individuals,
cases, documents, and events of importance for constitutional history
and law. This work will be a standard reference in the field, though one
cannot help expressing concern that teachers in American history and
65. Federalist (Kramnick), supra note 58, at 19.
66. R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 12-28.
67. Federalist (Kramnick), supra note 58, at 22.
68. R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 81-83, 97-110.
69. Federalist (Kramnick), back cover; id. at 11 & n.1.
70. The Encyclopedia of the American Constitution (L. Levy, K. Karst & D.
Mahoney eds., 4 vols. 1986).
71. The Founders' Constitution (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds., 5 vols. 1987). Volume 1, .M1ajor Themes, has just been issued in paperback.
72. 1 am one of the contributors to this project.
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government courses may find some of these articles distressingly familiar (via student plagiarism) in the years to come.
The Founders' Constitution is an altogether different enterprise.
Professors Philip Kurland and Ralph Lerner of the University of
Chicago have assembled in this five-volume compilation extracts from
the leading works of political theory, history, law, and constitutional
argument on which the Framers and their contemporaries drew and
which they themselves produced. The first volume focuses on general
themes of American constitutionalism; the succeeding volumes present
the text of the Constitution (up to the twelfth amendment, ratified in
1804), exhaustively annotated and glossed clause by clause in Talmudic
form with the central text threading its way through masses of commentary, explication, and illustrative citation. Professors Kurland and
Lerner break off their search for supplementary and illustrative materials with the mid-1830s, to incorporate Joseph Story's Commentaries on the
Constitution.73 Some may contend that Story, who was eight years old in
1787, does not really fit within the scope announced by this project's
title; others would argue that the editors should have pushed their inquiry forward to the present day. But these are captious quibbles with a
project remarkable for its learning and scholarly care. This set will be
most useful for smaller libraries and for individual scholars, who will
have at their fingertips access to the key passages of otherwise rare and
inaccessible texts, pamphlets, commentaries, and documents. It is destined to become the Oxford English Dictionary of American constitutional
history.
II. SCHOLARSHIP, NEW AND NOT-So-NEW

A. Introduction
Professor William E. Nelson has offered two short-hand descriptions of types of legal history: "lawyers' legal history," written to generate data and interpretations that are of use in resolving modern legal
controversies, and "historians' legal history," written to provide and
support new and interesting interpretations and bodies of data to advance exploration of the past.74 Recent scholarly publications on the
Founding Period and the origins of the Constitution suggest analogous
terms for constitutional history.
B. Elucidating the Past-Historians'ConstitutionalHistory
Specialists in the history of the Founding Period continue to pursue fruitful lines of research to develop new understandings of the ori73. J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833).
74. W. Nelson &J. Reid, The Literature of American Legal History 185, 235-37,

261-87 (1985). Professor Nelson adapted the term "lawyers' legal history" from
Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in American Legal History, 17 Am. J. Legal Hist.
273, 275-78 (1973).
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gins of the United States. The infusion of newly available primary
sources, together with the flourishing secondary literature on early
American history and culture, have long suggested the need for a synthesis of the Confederation period. The Forging of the Union,
1781-1789,7 5 the long-awaited volume in the New American Nation series by Richard B. Morris, will fill that gap for at least a generation to
come.
Professor Morris has been an active historian for six decades,
amassing a roster of publications in legal history, labor, diplomatic,
economic, political, and constitutional history, and biography that
would be a distinguished body of work for any half-dozen scholars. The
Forging of the Union is a notable landmark of his career.7 6 The book
ranges with assurance from the council rooms of Whitehall and Versailles to the streets, legislative halls, and counting houses of Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Annapolis, and Charleston to the woods and
snows of the Northwest Territory. This is, in many respects, a work of
traditional narrative history in the grand manner, weaving together
probing analyses of social, economic, cultural, and legal issues. Professor Morris draws on an extraordinary range of printed sources and secondary literature in several languages comprising nearly two centuries
of scholarly output, but this book is perhaps even more remarkable for
its command of primary source materials in libraries and government
archives on both sides of the Atlantic.
There are a multitude of excellences in The Forging of the Union.
Professor Morris's discussion of the economic health of the new repub77
lic is probably the most cogent available examination of its subject.
Was there an economic depression in the mid-1780s? Professor Morris
insists that there was, refuting the older work of the late Professor
Merrill Jensen (whose optimistic study The New Nation 78 was until now
our most detailed modem history of the United States under the Articles of Confederation). In addition, he demonstrates the importance of
this economic crisis in spurring the movement to strengthen (and, ultimately, to replace) the Articles. Similarly, Professor Morris presents an
authoritative account of the workings of government under the Confederation, judiciously considering the achievements and shortcomings of
the Confederation government, 79 and of foreign policy in the 1780s
and its significance in the quest for nationhood. 0 Focusing not just on
the details of diplomacy and administration of foreign policy but on the
75. R. Morris, The Forging of the Union, 1781-1789 (1987).
76. See e.g., Kline, The Writings of Richard B. Morris, in Perspectives in Early
American History: Essays in Honor of Richard B. Morris 375-85 (A. Vaughn & C. Billias
eds. 1973).

77. R. Morris, supra note 75, at 130-61.
78. M.Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation (1950).
79. R. Morris, supra note 75, at 55-110.
80. Id. at 194-219, 232-44.
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intellectual and political consequences of that policy, Professor Morris
confirms his argument in The American Revolution Reconsidered8' for the
pivotal importance of foreign policy concerns in assessing the performance of government under the Articles (another area shortchanged by
Jensen). And Professor Morris never loses sight of his central theme:
the process of nation-building and constitution-making.
Both supporters and challengers of Justice Thurgood Marshall's
recent criticisms of the Bicentennial celebrations8 2 will be fascinated by
Professor Morris's persuasive chapter, "A Cautiously Transforming
Egalitarianism. ' 8 3 Relying on the latest studies of social history, religious freedom, legal history, and the histories of women, blacks, Native
Americans, and other minorities, Professor Morris has produced a fairminded account of the ways in which the "forgotten people" of the
American Revolution were largely excluded from political power and
the mainstream of American life, yet not permanently barred from ultimately joining what Henry Adams would have called "the political
84
population."
Despite the scope, quality of and largely successful execution of
this book's grand design, some questions present themselves.
Professor Morris sets forth a convincing case for the primacy of the
Union over the states, predating the Revolution.8 5 Although he refutes
8 6
those who argue that "the states created the Federal Government"
and that there was no American nation or national consciousness in the
Founding Period,8 7 his schematic presentation is more a legal argument than an historical analysis. Professor Morris discounts the strong
evidence for localist sentiment in New York, Virginia, and other states.
One need not disagree with his conclusion, either historically or politically, to feel disquiet at his sometimes dismissive treatment of those
who distrusted national government in this period. And, despite the
generally first-rate analyses of key documents such as the Treaty of
Paris of 1783,88 his treatment of the details and importance of state
constitution-making in the 1770s and 1780s is surprisingly cursory.89
But the myriad' substantive and stylistic merits of The Forging of the
Union are what stand out. Professor Morris's book would be a major
81. R. Morris, The American Revolution Reconsidered 154-55 (1967).
82. Marshall, Commentary: Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1987).

83. R. Morris, supra note 75, at 162-93.
84. H. Adams, History of the United States of America During the Administration
of Thomas Jefferson 5 (1986).
85. R. Morris, supra note 75, at 55-79.
86. President Ronald Reagan declared this to be the case in his First Inaugural Address. President's Inaugural Address, 1 Pub. Papers 2 (Jan. 20, 1981).
87. But see infra note 154 and accompanying text.
88. R. Morris, supra note 75, at 196-205 (Treaty of Paris, 1783); id. at 80-91 (Articles of Confederation).
89. R. Morris, supra note 75, at 118-25.
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event for American historiography in any year; its appearance in 1987 is
peculiarly felicitous. All future students of the Founding Period will
have to begin their inquiries with this work.
Another major book that is at the same time traditional in its concerns and up-to-date in its methodology is Jack P. Greene's Peripheries
and Center. 90 Professor Greene examines the recurring problem of developing constitutional frameworks for an "extended polity" under the
traditions of Anglo-American constitutionalism. The question of forging a constitutional solution to governing a central territory and its colonies-a center and its peripheries-was at the heart of the
constitutional struggle between Britain and her North American colonies. Establishing a binding solution to a constitutional controversy required its ratification by both the center and the peripheries. In
mutated form during and after the Revolution, this problem became a
struggle between nationally minded and locally minded American politicians and political theorists-a contest culminating in the framing and
adoption of the Constitution. The Framers and supporters of the Constitution in 1787-1788 believed that they had arrived at a solution to
this dilemma by creating a system of government founded on the people of the United States and "endowed . . .with sovereign authority
coordinate with that of the states." 9 1 This system, they believed, would
enable each set of governmental institutions to check the other, "to
achieve both a workable division of authority between states and nation
92
and a satisfactory balance between local diversity and central unity."
Professor Greene points out that the hopes of the Framers were
only partly fulfilled, because the tension between the doctrines of coordinate sovereignty and popular sovereignty persisted. 93 The cautious
assertions of federal power in the early days of the Constitution and the
suspicions of adherents of state governments, anchored in the constitutional text in the tenth amendment, nourished this tension, and the development of a constitutional theory of state sovereignty side-by-side
with a constitutional theory of perpetual union founded on popular
sovereignty shaped the growing tensions between North and South.
The crisis of 1860-1861 and the Civil War demonstrated, Professor
Greene argues, that the original Constitution failed to resolve the problem of distributing authority between center and peripheries, and the
history of American constitutional law bears witness to the continuing
problem that disputes between center and peripheries "apparently can
94
be settled only by separation, force, or the threat thereof."
Professor Greene has long defended the importance of political
90. J. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (1986).
91. Id. at 212.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 212-13.
94. Id. at 216-17.
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and institutional history. In this study, he aligns himself with predecessors whose work has gone into eclipse-including Andrew C. McLaughlin, 9 5 Charles McIlwain, 9 6 and Charles M. Andrews 9 7-but Greene
single-handedly reinvigorates traditional institutional and constitutional history by fusing its methodology with that of legal historians
such as William E. Nelson, John Phillip Reid, Barbara A. Black, and
Peter S. Onuf and that of the history of political thought and ideology
we now associate with Bernard Bailyn and Gordon S. Wood.9 8
Professor Greene's new work may be profitably contrasted with the
essays of Edward S. Corwin, an "old master" of constitutional studies.
Cornell University Press has issued the second installment of a threevolume collection of Corwin's essays on American constitutional history and law under the general title Corwin on the Constitution.99 Volume
1,100 which appeared six years ago, collects Corwin's classic studies of
American constitutional thought in the Founding Period, together with
selected essays on the powers of Congress and the President's power to
remove government officers. The newly-issued Volume II focuses on
the judiciary; Volume III will collect Corwin's major essays on individual rights and international law. Many of these essays have hitherto
been scattered widely in obscure scholarly journals inaccessible to most
students of constitutional history and law, and the valuable selection of
essays edited by Alpheus Thomas Mason and Gerald Garvey has long
been out of print. 10 Richard Loss' devoted labors make available once
again some of the masterworks of an older generation of constitutional
02

scholarship. 1

Although sophisticated, subtle, and provocative in their uses of
original source materials and formulation of issues for research and
analysis, Corwin's essays are nonetheless old-fashioned. Corwin paid
careful attention to the structure and terms of political arguments, and
respected the need to understand Hamilton, Madison, and their colleagues in their historical context, but he never sought to reconstruct
the framework of implicit assumptions and generalizations about
human nature, society, and government that underlying the formal
95. A. McLaughlin, Constitutional History of the United States (1935); A.
McLaughlin, The Foundations of American Constitutionalism (1932); A. McLaughlin,
The Confederation and the Constitution, 1783-1789 (1905).
96. C. McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (1940); C. Mcllwain, The
American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation (1923).
97. C. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American History (4 vols. 1934-38); C.
Andrews, The Colonial Background of the American Revolution (1924).

98. See Greene, From the Perspective of Law: Context and Legitimacy in the Origins of the American Revolution, 85 S. Atlantic Q. 56 (1986).
99. E. Corwin, Corwin on the Constitution (R. Loss ed. 2 vols. to date 1981, 1987).
100. 1 E. Corwin, Corwin on the Constitution (1981).

101. E. Corwin, American Constitutional History (A. Mason & G. Garvey eds.
1964).
102. See also E. Corwin, Presidential Power and the Constitution (R. Loss cd.
1976).
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political discourse of the Revolutionary generation. By comparison
with such modem studies as Peripheriesand Center, Corwin's work, despite its lasting value, seems rootless and disconnected. Thus, Professor Greene's book offers encouragement to those who believe in the
intrinsic interest and utility of traditional institutional and constitutional history informed by recent developments and refinements of the
techniques of intellectual and political history.
Professor Forrest McDonald has also explored the intellectual context of the making of the Constitution, in Novus Ordo Seclorum. 10 3 This is
the third volume of Professor McDonald's trilogy dealing with the
Founding Period. Professor McDonald began his labors thirty years
ago; We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution1 04 appeared in
1958, and E Pluribus Unum 10 5 was published in 1965. McDonald's first
volume challenged the prevailing understanding of the work of the
Federal Convention, which at that time was rooted in Charles A.
106
Beard's Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.
Beard sought to demolish his era's received wisdom about the disinterested patriotism of the Founding Fathers, arguing that research into
their economic interests and property holdings demonstrated that they
had framed the Constitution to protect their own property, primarily
their holdings in government securities. McDonald's We the People was
one of the leading challenges to Beard's findings, though his own work
in turn became the focus of controversy. 10 7 E Pluribus Unum describes
the cut and thrust of state, sectional, and economic interests in American politics between 1776 and 1790-in effect, offering McDonald's
portrait of the clashing interests that produced the Constitution to replace the "Beardian" view. With Novus Ordo Seclorum, Professor McDonald now presents his interpretation of the intellectual sources of
the Americans' political experiments culminating with the Constitution.
Professor McDonald has written a learned, combative, and idiosyncratic book-which should not be news to those familiar with his earlier
volumes. He begins with a brief, invaluable statement of "the problem" facing Americans as a consequence of independence-in the
words of the Declaration of Independence, "to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety
103. F. McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (1985).
104. F. McDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution

(1958).
105. F. McDonald, E Pluribus Unum: The Formation of the American Republic
1776-1790 (1965). A new edition appeared in 1979.
106. C. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States

(1935).
107. See, e.g., Main, Charles Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Review of
Forrest McDonald's Me the People, 17 Wm.& Mary Q. (3d ser.) 86 (1960).
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and Happiness."' 10 8 McDonald identifies four "sets of considerations"
that "guided as well as limited" the Americans: (1) "providing protection for the lives, liberties, and property of the citizenry"; 1 9 (2) "the
commitment to republicanism";"10 (3) "history, in several senses of the
term"-as source material, as treasured legacy, and as a flow in which
the Americans found themselves;' 1 ' and (4) various bodies of political
theory. But, he points out, the Americans faced a difficulty 2of which
they were unaware: "[t]he ingredients were incompatible.""
The great body of Professor McDonald's book explores the various
systems of ideas, doctrines, common-law rules, political principles, economic theories, and shared experiences available to the Revolutionary
generation. Readers should be warned in advance to page through
each chapter to get a sense of the shape and flow of the argument, for
Professor McDonald often allows his enthusiasm for a particular byway
of his inquiry so much freedom that he repeatedly threatens to swamp
13
his grand design.
Novus Ordo Seclorum addresses the question of what role (quantitatively and qualitatively) theory played in the making of the Constitution. It combines several prevailing approaches to the Convention in
an analysis that may be summarized thus: although the Framers were
experienced practical politicians, they were also steeped in history,
political and economic theory, and the common law. They often had
clashing views of these bodies of theory and data, and irreconcilable
understandings of their respective importance and consequences.
They may have read the same books, but they read them in different
ways and for different reasons. Ideas or bodies of ideas such as economy, virtue, republicanism and so forth did not have common meanings. Moreover, the Americans did not necessarily get their ideas from
books; rather, as Professor McDonald (invoking Carl Becker) reminds
us, "men are generally influenced by those books which clarify their
own thought, express their own notions well, or suggest to them ideas
'
they are predisposed to accept. 14
Novus Ordo Seclorum covers much of the same ground dealt with by
Gordon S. Wood in The Creation of the American Republic,' 1 5 but Professors Wood and McDonald disagree on the conclusions they draw. Professor Wood sees a shift from early Revolutionary ideology, grounded
in the doctrines of classical republicanism and, as its basis, the virtue of
the citizenry, to a "new science of politics," the handiwork of the Feder108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

F. McDonald, supra note 103, at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 8.
See, e.g., id. at 9-55.

114. Id. at 84.
115. G. Wood, supra note 3.
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alists in framing and winning adoption of the Constitution. 1 16 Those
espousing this new vision rejected the old emphasis on virtue and argued that republican government could be constructed to take account
of the flaws of human nature without special concern for preserving
virtue as the foundation of a republic.1 17 Professor McDonald sees
more complexity, uncertainty, and contradiction in these structures of
ideas and assumptions about human nature, society, government, economy, and politics than does Professor Wood; for example, Professor
McDonald is not willing to read the funeral service for classical republicanism, civic humanism, and virtue as of 1787-1788. But Professors
type of historical investigation is
McDonald and Wood agree that this
18
both possible and worth pursuing."
At one point, Professor McDonald, whose book is solidly within the
sphere of historians' constitutional history, speaks directly to the controversy now raging over "original intent":
It should be obvious from this survey that it is meaningless to
say that the Framers intended this or that the Framers intended that: their positions were diverse and, in many particulars, incompatible. Some had firm, well-rounded plans, some
had self-contradictory ideas, some were guided only by vague
ideals. Some of their differences were subject to compromises; others were not.
Their understanding was further complicated by the fact
that they represented states and voted as states, and most delegates felt obliged to champion the interests of their states as
they perceived them. Several delegations were divided against
themselves. 19
Although much enlightenment is available in Novus Ordo Seclorum,
there is also a good deal to disagree with in these pages. First,
Professor McDonald's chapter "The Lessons of Experience:
1776-1787"12o generally substantiates but does not explicitly confront
the problem of differing perceptions of American affairs in the Confederation period. As ProfessorJack Rakove has pointed out, issues of foreign policy, national weakness, and interstate rivalry had less
significance for most ordinary Americans because they did not impinge
directly on daily life; by contrast, these issues mattered a great deal to
those Americans who habitually paid attention to such concerns,
whether from official responsibility or intellectual inclination.' 2 1 Sec116. Id. at v,593-615.
117. Id. passim.

118. Although Professor McDonald ruefully muses, "It could be, of course, that my
timing once again is bad. The ideological school has come under attack from some
quarters and is being ignored by the many who have gone on to psychohistory, family
history, 'cliometrics, and other exotica'." F. McDonald, supra note 103, at ix.
119. Id. at 224.
120. Id. at 143-83.
121. J. Rakove, supra note 2, at 334; R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2. at 83.
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ond, Professor McDonald slights the critical importance of foreign policy difficulties in the Confederation period-a point given new
importance by the work of Richard B. Morris and Frederick W. Marks
111.122 Third, Professor McDonald's lawyerly discussion of the problem
of sovereignty 123 downplays the ambiguity of the division of sovereignty between the Continental Congress (and later the Confederation
Congress) and the states throughout the Revolutionary period.
Similarly, his discussion of ratification unaccountably declares that,
despite the specific provision of Article VII that the ratifications of only
nine states were sufficient to establish the Constitution as the new instrument of government of the United States, contradicting the Articles
of Confederation, which required unanimous consent by all thirteen
states to give effect to amendments, the ratification process of
1787-1788 constituted a valid amendment of the Articles. ' 24 While, in
the end, all thirteen states did ratify the Constitution, surely Professor
McDonald is aware that only eleven states were represented in the First
Congress that convened in April of 1789, that when North Carolina
ratified the Constitution in November of 1789 and Rhode Island finally
ratified in May of 1790, the two states joined a Union with a government already in operation, and that before these states ratified the Constitution they were in a jurisdictional limbo vis-A-vis the government
operating under the Constitution. 12 5 Fifth, Professor McDonald unduly minimizes the importance of Shays's Rebellion in spurring the
movement to call the Federal Convention. Most observers agree that
the uprisings of "desperate debtors" under the symbolic leadership of
Daniel Shays-focused in Massachusetts, but including risings in every
New England state but Rhode Island and even as far south as Virginia
and South Carolina1 26 -- posed a serious threat to the stability and authority of the state governments, and reports of the Shaysite uprisings
alarmed moderate and conservative nationalists throughout the nation. 12 7 Professor McDonald persists, however, in treating the matter
as a minor squabble deliberately exaggerated by the Confederation's
Secretary for War, Henry Knox of Massachusetts, by means that we
122. R. Morris, supra note 81, at 154-55; R. Morris, supra note 75, at 194-219,
232-44; F. Marks, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution passim (1973).
123. F. McDonald, supra note 103, at 144-52.
124. Id. at 279.
125. See the account in R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 213, 243-72
(especially 267-71), and sources cited in id. at 311 nn.26-27, 315-19. Compare
Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L.J. 1013, 1020-23, 1058-59 (1984)
(extra-legal origins of Constitution a critical element of understanding the constitutional
principles grounded in the Constitution and The Federalist).
126. R. Morris, supra note 75, at 264-65.
127. See id. at 258-66; D. Szatmary, Shays' Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian
Insurrection 120-33 (1980); R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 97.
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would describe today as disinformation. 128
Finally, Professor McDonald's otherwise subtle and perceptive account of the influence of David Hume's political essays on James
29
Madison's understanding of factions and interests in a republic'
needlessly minimizes Madison's recognition that factions could find
their causes in attachments to particular leaders or families and religious zeal. Professor McDonald claims that Madison had no personal
130
experience or "felt heritage" of these causes of factionalism.
Madison's experience as the key figure in the successful campaign to
disestablish the Church of England in Virginia' 3 ' heightened his sensitivity to the divisiveness of religion in public life, even though Madison
was a member of the very denomination he sought to topple. And
Madison's experience of Virginia politics, in which established families
such as the Harrisons, the Lees, and the Randolphs and their allies
were pitted against "new men" such as Patrick Henry, 13 2 made him
fully aware of the importance of familial connections as sources of factional strife.
Paradoxically, Professor McDonald's book suffers from its greatest
strength-his close attention to and emphasis on the Constitution's intellectual roots. It may well be the case that one or another Framer's or
Federalist's or Anti-Federalist's ideas came from Montesquieu originally, but was the historical actor necessarily aware of this? Although
Professor McDonald may have felt the need to note Carl Becker's warning about treating the relationship between an historical figure's ideas
and the books he read with caution, his tendency to cast various delegates to the Convention as Humeans or Montesquieuans1 3 3 unwittingly
perpetuates the problem of seeing the Convention soley as a seminar in
political theory.
Another attempt to enter into the intellectual world of the Founding Period is Morton White's Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitu135
tion.13 4 Professor White is best known as a historian of philosophy;
in this study, he focuses on The Federalist,using it as a means to trace the
intellectual concepts and philosophical understandings underlying the
work of the Framers of the Constitution. Professor White's study is
intricate and challenging, demanding a high degree of sophistication
128. F. McDonald, supra note 103, at 177, 180.
129. F. McDonald, supra note 103, at 162-66; see also D. Adair, Fame and the
Founding Fathers (T. Colbourn ed. 1974).
130. F. McDonald, supra note 103, at 216.
13 1. R. Berstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 67-69; Brant, Madison: On the Separation of Church and State, 8 Win. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 3-24 (1951). See generally T.
Buckley, Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia 1776-1787 (1977).
132. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., F. McDonald, supra note 103, at 233-35, 259.
134. M. White, Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution (1987).
135. See, e.g., M. White, The Philosophy of the American Revolution (1978); M.
White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism (1957).
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from the reader in following his exegeses of the ideas of John Locke
and David Hume, and their contrasting views of such hallmarks of The
Federalistand the debate over the Constitution as "reason" and "experience," "history" and "human nature." Professor White examines the
ways in which these philosophers and their contemporaries helped to
shape the ideas of Hamilton and Madison, and ultimately the defense
and explication of the Constitution set forth in The Federalist.
To use The Federalistas a means to understand the Constitution and
its underlying philosophy is a risk-laden pursuit, especially if undertaken for the purpose not of historical understanding but of prescription for modern constitutional law and politics. Such is the enterprise
at the heart of Vincent Ostrom's The Political Theory of a Compound Republic,1 36 a 1970 study newly revised for the Bicentennial. Professor
Ostrom frankly concedes that he discounts the historical context of the
origins of The Federalist,using arguments of Hamilton and Madison (he
omits John Jay from consideration) to build a theory of "constitutional
choice" emphasizing the ideas of a compound republic and government decentralization for our own day. 13 7 By contrast, Professor White
enters into his interpretative venture with full knowledge of the many
difficulties in his path:
Somewhere in the middle of my journey to the end of this
book I came to appreciate the great difficulty of trying to formulate the philosophy of a work such as The Federalist, a work
which is not exclusively or even primarily philosophical in purpose. The scholar who studies a strictly philosophical text has
the advantage of studying one which usually contains an argument that leads to philosophical conclusions, and therefore
such a scholar's task may be limited to clarifying that argument
and those conclusions. By contrast, my task in presenting the
philosophy of The Federalist was peculiarly difficult because I
sought to extract a philosophy from a work whose authors
were not primarily concerned with advocating one....
...

I hope, therefore, that this work will be judged as a

study which is primarily concerned to show the part that philosophy played in The Federalist's defense of the Constitution.
How big a part I leave it to others to say, to others who are
ingenious enough to measure in a clear way the relative importance of3 8 intellectual and nonintellectual factors in that
defense. '

It is a measure of the value of Professor White's erudite and complex
book that he remains faithful throughout to the vision sketched in the
136. V. Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic (rev. ed. 1987).
137. Id. at 1-28. Professor Ostrom's book is one of the major studies in the "public choice" school of political science, whose practitioners apply the tools of economic
analysis to the study of political decisionmaking. See generally D. Mueller, Public
Choice (1979).
138. M. White, supra note 134, at vii, 8.
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passage quoted above, and that he pursues his interpretative and reconstructive purposes with intellectual integrity, and especially, with fidelity to the history of political thought in the Founding Period. Some
readers may object to Professor White's tendency to read the essays
collected in The Federalist as writings by the fictional "Publius" rather
than as the sometimes inconsistent writings of Hamilton, Madison, and
Jay. Clinton Rossiter once pointed out, however, that Publius speaks in
The Federalistas "at least as whole a personality as any reasonable man
can be when he has to deal with the everlasting tensions of free government. His own tensions ...are only an honest reflection of those built
into the Constitution."' 1 39 Although Professor White's study says little
to the modern constitutional lawyer seeking the support of Publius for
a given position or constitutional interpretation, it will be of great value
to those who take the history of ideas seriously. Professor White demonstrates how political thought and political action intersected in the
Founding Period to produce in the Constitution and The Federalist superb examples of what he aptly calls "political technology" (that is, descriptions and defenses of methods to solve problems of politics and
government, rather than descriptions of those problems
themselves).140

A symposium volume occasioned by the Bicentennial is a first-rate
exploration of the frontiers of historical scholarship on the Founding
Period. Beyond Confederation, edited by Richard R. Beeman, the late
Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter II, presents a fine collection of
papers delivered at a 1984 conference in Philadelphia. 14 As Professor
Beeman points out in his introduction, several of the collected essays
show an appreciation of the importance of the "republican synthesis"
pioneered by such scholars as Douglass Adair, J.G.A. Pocock, Bernard
Bailyn and Gordon S. Wood 142 together with an inclination to move
beyond these scholars' emphasis on the ideas of classical republican
thought. Professor Stanley Katz' 43 reminds us that the Americans also
drew on bodies of legal and constitutional thought distinct fromthough not inconsistent with-republican doctrines in their disputes
with Great Britain and their efforts to frame a new system of government for themselves after the winning of independence.
Professor Ralph Lerner challenges the Bailyn-Wood republican
synthesis directly; 14 4 emphasizing the conscious construction and use
139. Rossiter, Introduction to The Federalist Papers, supra note 46, at xv.
140. M. White, supra note 134, at 13, 199-200.

141. Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National
Identity (R. Beeman, S. Botein & E. Carter II eds. 1987).

142. Beeman, Introduction to Beyond Confederation, supra note 141, at 3-12. See
the articles by Shalhope cited infra note 296.
143. Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary Interpretation, in Beyond
Confederation, supra note 141, at 23-37.
144. Lerner, The Constitution of the Thinking Revolutionary, in Beyond Confeder-

ation, supra note 141, at 38-68. Professor Lerner has revised this essay for republica-
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by the members of the Revolutionary generation of intellectual and
political arguments, Professor Lerner rejects the implication that the
Framers and their contemporaries were "prisoners" of ideological systems and that their political and constitutional discourse was nothing
more than reflexive invocations of inculcated bodies of ideas.
Gordon Wood focuses on the perennial controversy over the conflict between virtue and self-interest in American politics in the Founding Period. 1 45 Traditionally, the Anti-Federalists have appeared as
defenders of the idea that government had to encourage virtue in the
citizenry in order to sustain a republic, the only form of government
that could preserve liberty; on the other hand, Federalists argued that
government could be structured to take advantage of human beings'
tendencies to pursue their own interests, rather than to encourage virtue, because self-interest itself could be used to preserve a republic.
Professor Wood argues that, whereas the Federalists had constructed
the Constitution to ensure the selection of disinterested statesmen who
would pursue the general interest, Anti-Federalists such as William
Findley of Pennsylvania were aggressively entrepreneurial and thus
fully willing to tolerate pursuit of one's own self-interests in politics;
thus, Professor Wood maintains that the Anti-Federalists were closer to
the future development of American politics than the Federalists were.
Several essays in Beyond Confederation treat familiar topics in unfamiliar and thus suggestive ways. Two essays on James Madison, by
Lance Banning

46

and Drew McCoy,'

47

demonstrate the protean na-

ture and enduring fascination of Madison's role in the Founding Period. Professor Banning focuses on the significance of the Convention
for Madison's development as a theoretician and constitutional politician; Professor McCoy considers Madison as a Southerner and a Virginian, recovering the localist currents in the political thought of a man
traditionally acclaimed as one of our most ardent nationalists.
Professor Richard D. Brown declares that Shays's Rebellion had little
influence on the Massachusetts ratifying campaign, except insofar as
the harsh measures taken to suppress the rebellion encouraged public
sympathy for the debtors and hostility to measures favored by their option as the prologue to his important new book (which unfortunately arrived too late for
detailed discussion in this Article), R. Lerner, The Thinking Revolutionary: Principle
and Practice in the New Republic (1987).
145. Wood, Interest and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution, in
Beyond Confederation, supra note 141, at 69-109.
146. Banning, The Practicable Sphere of a Republic: James Madison, the Constitutional Convention, and the Emergence of Revolutionary Federalism, in Beyond Confed-

eration, supra note 141, at 162-87.
147. McCoyJames Madison and Visions of American Nationality in the Confederation Period: A Regional Perspective, in Beyond Confederation, supra note 141, at
226-58.
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ponents.14 8 Professor Richard E. Ellis traces the persistence and transformation of Anti-Federalism even after the Constitution's apparent
triumph in 1789.149 Finally, Professor Paul Finkelman presents a meticulous account of the Constitution's proslavery bias, tracing the Convention's many compromises on slavery-including the adoption of the
three-fifths ratio for representation and taxation, the fugitive slave
clause, and the compromises protecting for twenty years the transAtlantic slave trade-and endorsing the antebellum abolitionist critique
of the Constitution.'

50

Still other essays in this volume preview exciting developments in
the study of the Founding Period. Jack N. Rakove's essay "The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George Washington"' 151 offers the
hope of an entirely new approach to understanding the beginnings of
government under the Constitution, one that stresses the emerging
possibilities of politics on a national scale and the consequences of this
untried form of politics for the several theories of representation and of
the permissible role of the new government held by the Framers, the
Federalists, and the Anti-Federalists. Similarly, Stephen Botein's superb meditation on "Religious Dimensions of the Early American
State"' 152 urges us to escape from the well-worn contours of the debate
over the original understanding of relations between church and state
by seeking to understand this aspect of the past in its own terms. And
Professor Janet Riesman's essay on Federal and Anti-Federal conceptions of political economy and the importance of prosperity in Ameriof
can political discourse marks a major advance in our understanding
1 53
the economic dimensions of the debate over the Constitution.
John M. Murrin's concluding essay, "A Roof Without Walls: The
Dilemma of American National Identity,"1 54 presents a suggestive and
daring response to the arguments that the American Revolution represented a stage in the ongoing development of an American national
identity. Professor Murrin highlights the difficulties of forging a new
national identity in the 1770s and 1780s, ironically noting that the
forces of nationalism pointed backward to Great Britain as the source
148. Brown, Shays's Rebellion and the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in
Massachusetts, in Beyond Confederation, supra note 141, at 113-27.

149. Ellis, The Persistence of Antifederalism after 1789, in Beyond Confederation,
supra note 141, at 295-314.
150. Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant
with Death, hi Beyond Confederation, supra note 141, at 188-225.

151. Rakove, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George Washington, in
Beyond Confederation, supra note 141, at 261-94.
152. Botein, Religious Dimensions of the Early American State, in Beyond Confed-

eration, supra note 141, at 315-30.
153. Riesman, Money, Credit, and Federalist Political Economy, hi Beyond Confederation, supra note 141, at 128-61.
154. Murrin, A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity,

in Beyond Confederation, supra note 141, at 333-48.
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of the nationalizing factors of American life, not forward to an independent nation. Even those historians, such as the present writer,
who hold to the view that Professor Murrin criticizes, will benefit from
his vigorous essay redressing the balance between nationalism and parochialism-what Professor Greene would call centrifugal and centripetal tendencies-in the making of the Constitution and the American
political community. If historians working in this field explore the ideas
and suggestions marked out in Beyond Confederation, they will add significantly to our understanding of the Founding Period.
Another symposium appears in the William and Mary Quarterly-for
more than four decades the leading journal of early American history
and culture. The Quarterly'sJuly 1987 issue' 5 5 devoted to the Constitution is an equally important conspectus of the new scholarship.
James H. Hutson offers a cautionary keynote to this issue in his
essay, "Riddles of the Federal Constitutional Convention."1 5 6 Drawing
on his familiarity with the Convention and with the many recent studies
of its work, Professor Hutson reminds us of the hazards of trying to
write the Convention's history in light of the uncertain state of the documentary record, 15 7 as well as our near-total lack of information and
evidence concerning the delegates' formal and informal discussions.
Dr. Hutson concludes by calling for a new scholarly consensus on our
understanding of the Convention.
In another essay, Steven Boyd explores another recurring issue of
our constitutional history. Analyzing the early understandings of the
Constitution's bar on state acts impairing the obligations of contracts,' 5 8 Professor Boyd champions the correctness of Madison's assertion in Federalist No. 39159 that the Constitution was neither wholly
federal nor wholly national but a mixture of the two. Professor Boyd
also shows the impossibility of establishing a clear and convincing statement of original intent underlying even a seemingly clear and specific
constitutional provision.
Robert Webking's article identifying Melancton Smith of New York
as the author of the two pamphlets published under the pseudonym the
"Federal Farmer"' 160 is a fine illustration that it is still possible to add to
our body of information about the origins of the Constitution as well as
to propose new interpretations. The "Federal Farmer" pamphlets, as
noted above,'61 are perhaps the best and most comprehensive single
155. 44 Win. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) (1987).
156. Hutson, Riddles of the Federal Constitutional Convention, 44 Win. & Mary O
(3d ser.) 411 (1987).

157. Id. at 411-19.
158. Boyd, The Contract Clause and the Evolution of American Federalism,
1789-1815, 44 Win. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 529 (1987); see U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 10.
159. The Federalist Papers, supra note 46, No. 39, at 240-46.
160. Webking, Melancton Smith and the Letlersfrom the Federal Farmer, 44 Wm.&
Mary Q. (3d ser.) 510 (1987).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 47, 48.
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statement of the moderate Anti-Federal position. For many decades, it

was widely believed that Richard Henry Lee of Virginia had written the
"Federal Farmer" pamphlets, but Gordon Wood demolished this attribution in 1974.162 Webking's persuasive argument in support of
Smith's authorship of the pamphlets is yet another indication of the
importance of this remarkable New York lawyer and politician who de63
serves more recognition.'
162. Wood, The Authorship of the Letters from the Federal Farmer, 31 Wm. &
Mary Q. (3d ser.) 299 (1974).
163. See Brooks, Alexander Hamilton, Melancton Smith, and the Ratification of the
Constitution in New York, 24 Wm. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 339 (1967); see also R. Ketcham,
supra note 44, at 256-57 (identifying Melancton Smith as author of Lettersfrom the Federal
Farmer).
Two additional points that Webking does not address may reinforce his central thesis. I am indebted to Gordon S. Wood for suggesting the first, which focuses on Smith's
reasons for not claiming the "Federal Farmer" essays as his own if he were indeed the
author. Whatever Smith's reasons for keeping silent before the New York ratifying convention-and they were probably the usual reasons described by Herbert Storing in his
general discussion of Anti-Federal pamphleteering, 2 Complete Anti-Federalist, supra
note 20, at 222 n.6-his vote for the Constitution, following his weeks of activity as the
Anti-Federal floor leader, would have presented insuperable political obstacles to his
stepping forward.
The second point, for which I am indebted to Kym S. Rice, focuses on additional
means to test Webking's argument. Webking's principal source material is Melancton
Smith's speeches in the New York ratifying convention. Research in Smith's surviving
private correspondence covering the ostensible dates of the "Federal Farmer" essays
may well yield additional confirmatory parallels. Compare, e.g., the Federal Farmer's
Letter XV, dated Jan. 18, 1788, covering article III and the judiciary, Letters from the
Federal Farmer, supra note 47, at 98:
In this country, we have been always jealous of the legislature, and especially
the executive; but not always of thejudiciary: but very few men attentively consider the essential parts of it, and its proceedings, as they tend to support or to
destroy free government: only a few professional men are in a situation properly to do this; and it is often alledged, that instances have not frequently occurred, in which they have been found very alert watchmen in the cause of
liberty, or in the cause of democratic republics. Add to these considerations,
that particular circumstances exist at this time to increase our inattention to
limiting properly the judicial powers, we may fairly conclude, we are more in
danger of sowing the seeds of arbitrary government in this department than in
any other.
with Letter from Melancton Smith to Abraham Yates, Jr. (17 Jan. 1788), Abraham Yates,
Jr., Papers, The New York Public Library, reprinted in R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra
note 2, at 228:
I wish you... would favour me, as your leisure and opportunities will permit,
with your observations on this system, especially on the Judicial powers of it,
about which very little has yet been written. It appears to me this part of the
system is so framed as to clinch all the other powers, and to extend them in a
silent and imperceptible manner to any thing and every thing, while the Court
who are vested with these powers are totally independent, uncontroullable and
not amenable to any other power in any decisions they may make.
More suggestive is the comparison as to the federal judiciary's equity powers. First
Smith's letter to Yates, as quoted in R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 228:
What are the cases in equity arising under the Constitution? Will not the
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Daniel Walker Howe's study of "The Political Psychology of The
Federalist"'64 differs from most of the recent students of Publius who
focus on "the enduring validity of the papers."' 6 5 Rather, Professor
Howe seeks to reconstruct the acceptance by Hamilton, Madison, and
Jay of the body of thought known as "faculty psychology."' 16 6 Faculty
psychology examines human faculties in terms of their purposes, and is
rooted in the works of such writers as Lord Shaftesbury, Thomas Reid,
and John Witherspoon. Professor Howe seeks to identify the sources
of Publius' understanding of human nature and to show how that understanding, informed by faculty psychology, molded The Federalist's
theories of good government, its prescriptions for achieving it, and its
"techniques for persuading men to adopt it. ' ' 167 In this respect, Professor Howe's essay is in the tradition of Morton White's fine monograph on The Federalist discussed above. 168
It is fitting that the Quarterly has devoted a substantial part of this
special issue to a Forum on Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American
Republic, the most influential single work of historical scholarship on the
Founding Period to appear in the past two decades. A dozen specialists
in the history of the Founding Period offer their reactions to and matured reflections on Professor Wood's book-its argument, its enduring significance, and its influence on the field-with Professor Wood
supreme court under this clause have a right to enlarge the extent of the powers of the general government-and to curtail that of the States at pleasure?
Now, the Federal Farmer, Letter XV:
By art. 3 sect. 2, "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity,
arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States," &c. What is here
meant by equity? what is equity in a case arising under the Constitution?...
Perhaps, the clause would have the same meaning were the words, "this constitution," omitted: there is in it either a careless complex misuse of words, in
themselves of extensive signification, or there is some meaning not easy to be
comprehended. Suppose a case arising under the constitution- suppose the
question judicially moved, whether, by the constitution, congress can suppress
a state tax laid on polls, lands, or as an excise duty, which may be supposed to
interfere with a federal tax. By the letter of the constitution, congress will appear to have no power to do it: but then the judges may decide the question on
principles of equity as well as law. Now, omitting the words, "in law and equity," they may decide according to the spirit and true meaning of the constitution, as collected from what must appear to have been the intentions of the
people when they made it. Therefore, it would see m , that if these words mean
any thing, they must have a further meaning: yet I will not suppose it intended
.to lodge an arbitrary power or discretion in the judges, to decide as their conscience, their opinions, their caprice, or their politics might dictate. Without
dwelling on this obscure clause, I will leave it to the examination of others.
Letters from the Federal Farmer, supra note 47, at 104-05.
164. Howe, The Political Psychology of The Federalist, 44 Win. & Mary Q (3d ser.)
485 (1987).
165. Id. at 485.
166. Id. at 489.
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
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having the final word. 16 9
Nearly all the commentators find many good things to say about
Creation, but the criticisms they offer represent a remarkable variety of
individual concerns, priorities, and (in some cases) complaints. Edward
Countryman, 170 Jackson Turner Main,' 7 1 and Gary B. Nash 17 2 argue

that Creation is too superficial, too monochromatic in its view of the
political thought of the Revolutionary era; they contend that Professor
Wood has bypassed or ignored evidence of conflict and disparate traditions of understanding politics and society. Essentially, they charge,
Professor Wood is writing "elitist" history due to his almost exclusive
reliance on the writings of the literate and the articulate. Several commentators-notably John M. Murrint 7 3 -draw on the works of Lance
Banning, 174 Drew McCoy, 17 5 and others extending the "republican
synthesis" into the early national and Jeffersonian periods to suggest
that Professor Wood's interment of classical republicanism and civic
humanist thought in 1787-1788 was premature. Ruth Bloch' 76 adds
that Creation inadequately assesses the importance of religion in the
political culture of the Founding Period (a view shared by Stephen
Botein).1 7 7 Jack Rakove' 78 and Peter Onuf 179 suggest that Creation offers perhaps too intellectualized a view of politics, one too distant from
the actual issues and problems of governance that the Americans faced
in this period. Ralph Ketcham, 8s' Pauline Maier,' 8 1 and John R. Howe,
Jr.'8 2 criticize Creation's view of the Anti-Federalists as too optimistic
169. Forum, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787: A Symposium of
Views and Reviews, 44 Wm. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 549 (1987).
170. Countryman, Of Republicanism, Capitalism, and the "American Mind," 44
Win. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 556, 558 (1987).
171. Main, An Agenda for Research on the Origins and Nature of the Constitution
of 1787-1788, 44 Win. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 591, 592-93 (1987).
172. Nash, Also There at the Creation: Going Beyond Gordon S. Wood, 44 Win. &
Mary Q. (3d ser.) 602, 603-06 (1987).
173. Murrin, Gordon S. Wood and the Search for Liberal America, 44 Wm. & Mary
Q. (3d ser.) 597, 599-600 (1987); see also Diggins, Between Bailyn and Beard: The
Perspectives of Gordon S. Wood, 44 Wm. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 563, 565 (1987); Wills,
Talking Ourselves Out of a Fight, 44 Wm. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 623, 626-27 (1987).
174. L. Banning, TheJeffersonian Persuasion (1978).
175. D. McCoy, The Elusive Republic (1980).
176. Bloch, The Consitution and Culture, 44 Wm. & Mary Q. 550, 553-5 (1987).
177. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
178. Rakove, Gordon S. Wood, the "Republican Synthesis," and the Path Not
Taken, 44 Wm. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 617, 619 (1987).
179. Onuf, State Politics and Ideological Transformation: Gordon S. Wood's Republican Revolution, 44 Win. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 612, 614 (1987).
180. Ketcham, Publius: Sustaining the Republican Principle, 44 Wm. & Mary Q.
(3d ser.) 576, 578-79 (1987).
181. Maier, A Pearl in a Gnarled Shell: Gordon S. Wood's The Creation of the American Republic Reconsidered, 44 Win. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 583, 587-88 (1987).
182. Howe, Gordon S. Wood and the Analysis of Political Culture in the American
Revolutionary Era, 44 Wm. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 569, 573 (1987).
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and black-and-white; from varying perspectives, they challenge Professor Wood's view of the Anti-Federalists as heroes of the cause of democratic government.
In his response, Professor Wood perceives two main themes running through the Forum: "(1) the relation between ideology and behavior, and (2) the relation between what have been called 'classical
republicanism' and 'liberalism.' ",183 He ably defends his view of the
relationship between political culture and political action, though he
reads Professor Rakove's strictures concerning his book as too sweeping a rejection of studying political ideas and ideology. Professor
Rakove asks only that historians respect the balance between the study
of ideas and the study of events and acts in writing political history.
Professor Wood also reproves Professors Ketcham and Maier, arguing
that they fail to take Anti-Federal thought seriously because they have
"bought" the Federalists' characterizations of both the Constitution
and its opponents. In his discussion of the debate between "classical
republicanism" and "liberalism"-what might be called the revived
coroner's report on classical republicanism-Professor Wood parallels
his argument in his essay in Beyond Confederation,184 maintaining that the
Constitution contained the seeds of destruction of the classical republican dream of a society governed by virtue and the seeds of a new political and social order permitting-even encouraging-the pursuit of
self-interest undiluted by considerations of the common good. He also
reiterates his argument that this transformation spelled the end of republicanism and its replacement by liberal democracy.
Jack Rakove and William E. Nelson, in two articles that are probably the most significant pieces in this symposium, offer the hope of a
new coherent understanding of the Convention in response to James
Hutson's opening plea for a new interpretative model. 185 In "The
Great Compromise: Ideas, Interests, and the Politics of Constitution
Making,"' 86 Professor Rakove uses the Convention's compromise over
representation of 16July 1787 as the foundation of his effort to develop
an understanding of the Convention's workings as something more
than a mere series of negotiations of state and sectional interests or a
seminar on political and constitutional theory. In his view (one shared
by the present writer), the Framers of the Constitution acted simultaneously as tough-minded protectors of the interests of their states and
constituencies and as intellectual politicians groping towards a vision of
an American nation governed by republican principles. Similarly, in
"Reason and Compromise in the Establishment of the Federal Consti183. Wood, Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America, 44 Wm.& Mary Q. (3d

ser.) 628, 628 (1987).
184. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
185. Hutson, supra note 156, at 411, 423.

186. Rakove, The Great Compromise: Ideas, Interests, and the Politics of Constitution Making, 44 Win. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 424, 426-27 (1987).
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tution, 1787-1801,"187 Professor Nelson convincingly argues that the

Framers operated on two levels of political argument at once: interestgroup politics and "constitutional" or "instrumental-reasoning" politics. The former is self-explanatory; when practicing the latter, the delegates to the Convention did not set out to advance interests of their
states or sections but engaged in reasoned and temperate explorations
of institutional means to achieve the public good or general interest.
Professor Nelson traces this distinction between interest-group and
constitutional politics through the controversy over ratification and
into the first decade of politics under the Constitution. Throughout
this period, Professor Nelson argues, the distinction persisted between
issues that pitted interests against each other and issues that posed
larger general questions about the means to achieve fundamental ends
desired by all members of the political community.
Three other collections of essays on the origins of the Constitution
present useful surveys of prevailing modern understandings of the
field. The Framingand Ratification of the Constitution,1 8 8 edited by Professors Leonard W. Levy and Dennis J. Mahoney, gathers essays by leading constitutional historians, includingJohn M. Murrin, Jack P. Greene,
Jack N. Rakove, Judith A. Best, Peter S. Onuf, and Robert A. Rutland,
summarizing their recent work. This collection is a reliable and wellconsidered collaborative history of the making of the Constitution. The
Reluctant Pillar,18 9 edited by Professor Stephen L. Schechter, focuses on
New York State and the adoption of the Constitution, combining interpretative and historiographical essays with detailed assemblages of primary data into a useful sourcebook for students of this pivotal battle of
the ratification controversy. Another specialized collection, this one focusing on The Federalist, is Saving the Revolution, 190 edited by Charles
Kesler. The product of a 1985 conference, this fine anthology assembles leading historians and political scientists who examine various aspects of The Federalist's origins, political and constitutional arguments,
and subsequent fate in the hands of nineteenth- and twentieth-century
politicians, judges, and academics.
C. The Significance of Historians' ConstitutionalHistory
for ConstitutionalDiscourse
One of the central concerns of this essay is the widening gap between historians' constitutional history and lawyers' constitutional his187. Nelson, Reason and Compromise in the Establishment of the Federal Constitution, 1787-1801, 44 Win. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 458, 460-61 (1987).
188. The Framing and Ratification of the Constitution (L. Levy & D. Mahoney eds.
1987).
189. The Reluctant Pillar: New York and the Adoption of the Federal Constitution
(S. Schechter ed. 1985).
190. Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding (C.

Kesler ed. 1987).
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tory. As lawyers and judges continue their quest for the articulable and
applicable "intent of the Framers" and as historians pursue their efforts
to recover and reconceive the past, each group tends to view the other's
concerns and proposals with puzzlement, if not outright hostility. Witness, for example, Gordon S. Wood's recent comments on this
question:
When confronted with [Federalists' and Anti-Federalists'] contrasting meanings of the Constitution, historians, it seems to
me, are not supposed to decide which was more "correct" or
more "true." Our task is rather to explain the reasons for
these contrasting meanings and why each side should have
given to the Constitution the meaning it did. There was not in
1787-1788-and today there is still not-one "correct" or
"true" meaning of the Constitution. The Constitution means
whatever we want it to mean. Of course, we cannot attribute
any meaning we want and expect to get away with it. We have
to convince others of our "true" interpretation, and if we can
convince enough people that that is the "true" meaning, then
so it becomes. That is how the culture changes. It may be a
necessary fiction for lawyers and jurists to believe in a "correct" or "true" interpretation of the Constitution in order to
carry on their business, but we historians have different obligations and aims.' 9 '
Professor Wood's concern about the differing "obligations and
aims" of historians' constitutional history and lawyers' constitutional
history has immediate application to The Creation of the American Republic
and the "republican" school of historians of the Founding Period. To
an extent that Professor Wood himself might not realize, Creation has
had a major influence on those who practice lawyers' constitutional history. It is cited repeatedly by scholars seeking to legitimate judicial review by reference to the central values and principles of the American
political and constitutional system.' 9 2 In addition, recent work in constitutional jurisprudence juxtaposes the traditions of "liberal legalism"
(a term describing the complex of ideas and values at the heart of our
modern legal system) with the supposed lost opportunities for a communitarian legal and jurisprudential system represented by the abandoned republican synthesis.' 9 3 Creation has played a central role in
both these enterprises. Thus, the vigorous and combative William and
Mary Quarterly Forum on Creation is especially important as a potential
191. Wood, supra note 183, at 632-33.
192. See, e.g., J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory ofJudicial Review 5, 89,
116, 120 (1980). These citations indicate legal scholars' habit of mining Creation for
useful quotations to be plugged into a presentist argument.
193. See, e.g., Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 1825, 1827-28 & n.12,
1831-35 (1987); see also Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 17-77 (1986).
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corrective to the legal community's overextensive reliance on one view
of the Founding Period, no matter how good that one study might be.
Despite Professor Wood's qualms, which on their face are directed
at a specific brand of lawyers' constitutional history--"original intent"
scholarship' 94-it is possible for legal and constitutional theorists to
draw on both the newest research in original sources and the newest
interpretative products of historians' constitutional history to advance
194. A superb theoretical study of the problems posed by what the Attorney General dubs the jurisprudence of original intent"is Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1237 (1986). Two of the best studies of the
original understanding and historical background of constitutional provisions are L.
Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (1985); and T. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and
State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment (1986). Other book-length
studies include: R. Berger, Federalism: The Founders' Design (1986); L. Levy, The
Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment (1987); R. Cord, Separation
of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction (1982).
The following list of articles from September 1983 to the present is representative,
not comprehensive, especially as it is drawn exclusively from law journals (historical
journals have contributed their share of articles to the original intent grist mill):
Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointment Clause, 37 Syracuse
L. Rev. 1037 (1986); Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim about
Original Intent, 27 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 875 (1985-86) (special issue); Kurland, The
Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 839
(1985-86) (special issue); Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 751 (1987); Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment and the "Jurisprudence of Original Intention," 74 Geo. LJ. 1719 (1986); Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in
the Early Republic, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 125 (1986); Simon, The Authority of the
Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 Calif. L.
Rev. 1482 (1985); Casto, The First Congress's Understanding of Its Authority over the
Federal Courts' Jurisdiction, 26 B.C.L. Rev. 1101 (1985); Smith, Getting Off on the
Wrong Foot and Back on Again: A Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson
Decisions, 20 Wake Forest L. Rev. 569 (1984); Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The
Supreme Court's Use of The FederalistPapers, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 65; Anastaplo, Mr.
Crosskey, the American Constitution, and the Nature of Things, 15 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 181
(1984); Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in the First State Bills of Rights: Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts, 10 Vt. L. Rev. 255 (1985);
Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to "Bear
Arms," 49 L. & Contemp. Probs. 151 (1986); Anastoplo, How to Read the Constitution
of the United States, 17 Loy. U. Chi. LJ. 1 (1985); Gennett, Judges and Original Intent,
22 Trial 60 (1986); Geyer, New Theories of "Interpretation": The Activist Flight from
the Constitution, 47 Ohio St. LJ. 1 (1986); Hamburger, The Development of the Law of
Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 661 (1985); Levy, The
Legacy Reexamined, 37 Stan L. Rev. 767 (1985); Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian:
Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 Stan L. Rev. 795
(1985); Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale LJ. 694 (1985); Simson, The Role of History in Constitutional Interpretation: A Case Study, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 253 (1985); Bogen, The Origins
of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 Md. L. Rev. 429 (1983); Mayton, Seditious Libel
and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 91 (1984);
Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82
Mich. L. Rev. 204 (1983); Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem-The Role of
the Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U.L. Rev. 811 (1983).
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the inquiries and research agenda of constitutional law. One ambitious
and largely successful attempt is Bruce Ackerman's Storrs Lectures at
Yale Law School, published as "Discovering the Constitution." 19 5 Professor Ackerman proposes to construct a new understanding ofjudicial
review different from the traditional view of that doctrine as "countermajoritarian." Traditional analysts of judicial review emphasize that
this power is exercised by a body of men and women who are not
elected or otherwise directly responsible to the people. This
nondemocratic institution's possession and use of such vast power as
the linchpin of a democratic polity presents a theoretical and political
paradox. For generations, constitutional scholars have produced a
large body of literature seeking various ways to legitimate the doctrine
ofjudicial review while constructing an intellectually defensible mechanism for guiding its exercise and limiting its reach. 19 6
Professor Ackerman describes this prevalent view of judicial review's origins, nature, and dangers as the product of the "Progressive"
interpretation of the Constitution's origins associated with Charles A.
Beard and other historical and legal scholars of the turn of the century.
He identifies a preoccupation with "the dangerous tendency of our
governmental institutions to act undemocratically . . . as a central
source of scholarly anxiety" in the modern disciplines of constitutional
history, law, and political science.1 9 7 In response to "Progressive" doctrines of judicial review, Professor Ackerman offers a "neo-Federalist"
vision of the Constitution that effectively restores judicial review to legitimacy despite its seemingly nondemocratic character. He uses The
Federalistas his jumping-off point:
The most important reason why The Federalist is worth reading-not merely by lawyers but by all thinking people-is that
it proposes a third way to solve the problem of revolutionary
legitimacy. While rejecting the possibility or desirability of
permanent revolution [the first way], The Federalistnonetheless
places a high value on puLi:"-r (yarding forms of political activity, in which people sacrifice :eir private interests to pursue
the common good in transient and informal political association. While rejecting revolutionary amnesia [the second way],
The Federalist insists that the public-regarding form of politics
should become preeminent only under certain well-defined
historical situations. When these conditions do not apply, the
claim of the legally established authorities to speak in the
name of the People [of the United States] must be conceded
by all thoughtful citizens. 9 8
195. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L.J.
1013 (1984).
196. See, e.g., A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (2d ed. 1986); R. Bernstein
with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 308 n.54.
197. Ackerman, supra note 195, at 1015.
198. Id. at 1020.
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Professor Ackerman maintains that "The Federalist'stask is to construct
the constitutional foundations for a different kind of politics"-what we
would recognize as interest-group politics. 199 Like Professors Rakove
and Nelson, Professor Ackerman identifies a distinction between "normal politics" (another term for interest-group politics-and "constitutional politics") those "moments of constitutional creation"
characterized by a quest to achieve the common or public good by "a
mobilized mass of American citizens" acting outside established institutions and through extraordinary means. 20 0 The problem facing the
practitioner of constitutional politics is how to comprehend and handle
the cycle between normal and constitutional politics-how "to palliate
the most pathological aspects of the normal condition." 2 0'
The Federalist chooses the latter path, using the newly-developed
ideas of representation to channel the course of normal politics "into
directions that do not endanger the principles of the American Revolution." 20 2 But, recognizing the danger that such institutional expedients
as the constitutionalization of these doctrines of representation may fail
to rein in the destructive tendencies of normal politics (for example, of
Congressional or Presidential actions), the Constitution contains a fail20 3
safe device-the doctrine of judicial review.
Judicial review, in Professor Ackerman's reading, is the means by
which a judge exercises her duty to remind another institution of government seeking to speak for the People of the United States that that
'20 4
institution cannot "abuse... the People's name in normal politics.
Ultimately, Professor Ackerman identifies judicial review as the third of
three measures by which the Constitution is designed "to economize
on virtue"-(1) the distinction between normal and constitutional politics; (2) the empowering of democratically elected government officials
by the doctrine of separation of powers to challenge other officials'
claims to speak for "the People"; and (3) the doctrine ofjudicial review,
which "gives judges special incentives to uphold the integrity of earlier
constitutional solutions against the pulling and hauling of normal politics." ' 20 5 Professor Ackerman then identifies the judicial interpretation
of the constitutional text-the authoritative utterance of the People of
the United States-not as antidemocratic, but rather as a preservation
of the dualist political system created by the Constitution. Because authoritative statements of the People of the United States are presumptively more weighty and binding than congressional or presidential
actions at the level of normal politics-even if based on an allegedly
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1022. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1024, 1022-24.
1025.
1025-29.
1030.
1031.
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authoritative popular mandate-the courts are not only empowered
but required to exercise judicial review to strike down those products of
normal politics that contradict the constitutional text.2 06
20 7
Paralleling the concerns later expressed by Professor Wood,
Professor Ackerman does not posit that his is the "correct" reading of
The Federalist. He simply suggests that the "mainstream" of modern
constitutional theory has misread The Federalist,has conscripted Publius
as a spear carrier in the battle to legitimate and constrain judicial review at the same time. Professor Ackerman's subtle and sensitive analysis ofjudicial review as an element of the "neo-Federalist Constitution"
is an excellent example of an historically sensitive use of historical evidence and materials to propose solutions to a contemporary legal and
constitutional dilemma. Furthermore, this proposed solution may have
interesting implications for historical discourse as well. For example,
consider Professor Wood's analysis in Beyond Confederation of the recurring problem of understanding virtue, self-interest, and the relations
between them as applied to Federalists and Anti-Federalists. 20 8 Rather
than seeing the Anti-Federalists he selects as more predictive of the
future course of development of the constitutional system than the Federalists because they were more apt to engage in the pursuit of selfinterest in politics, it is equally plausible to fit the Anti-Federalist case
studies at the heart of Professor Wood's argument into the "normal
politics" level of the nascent dualist structure of politics, and to see the
Federalists' and Anti-Federalists' political and polemical battle over the
Constitution in 1787-1788 as taking place on the higher level of constitutional politics.
One could point out that Ackerman's project is based on little
more than a reading of The Federalistand of Wood's Creation of the American Republic. Is this article historically sensitive or selective? The response is that although Ackerman may well have read selectively, he
uses the materials he draws on, however selective his research, with ample sensitivity to their arguments and historical contexts. Moreover, inasmuch as this study is an interim report on a much larger work-inprogress, perhaps such criticisms of Ackerman's selectivity are
premature.
D. Conscripting the Past in the Service of the Present: The Allure and Pitfalls
of Lawyers' ConstitutionalHistory
One of the long-standing controversies of American constitutional
law is whether we are bound in interpreting the Constitution by the
"intent of the Framers" or the "original understanding" of the Constitution or one of its provisions. Within recent years, that dispute has
206. Id. at 1044-72.
207. Wood, supra note 183, at 632-33.
208. Wood, supra note 145.
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been revived not only within the scholarly and legal communities but
also in public controversy. The leading spokesman for the "Jurisprudence of Original Intention" is Attorney General Edwin Meese III. His
opponents tend to be constitutional lawyers and scholars affiliated with
the liberal jurisprudential landmarks that the Attorney General and his
20 9
allies have repeatedly denounced.
In two speeches in 1985, Attorney General Meese urged "a deference to what the Constitution-its text and intention-may demand...
ajurisprudence of Original Intention. '2 10 The Attorney General threw
down the gauntlet to opponents of the Reagan Administration's positions on modern constitutional controversies:
Those who framed the Constitution chose their words carefully; they debated at great length the most minute points.
The language they chose meant something. It is incumbent
upon the Court to determine what that meaning was. This is
not a shockingly new theory; nor is it arcane or archaic.
.... It has been and will continue to be the policy of this
administration to press for a Jurisprudence of Original Intention. In the cases we file and those we join as amicus, we will
endeavor to resurrect the original meaning of constitutional
provisions and statutes as the only reliable guide for
2 11
judgment.
Afterwards Justices Brennan and Stevens, in public speeches, impliedly
criticized the call of the Attorney General for a Jurisprudence of Original Intent as "arrogance cloaked as humility" (Brennan)21 2 and
stressed "[t]he importance of evaluating subsequent developments in
the law, as well as the original intent of the Framers" (Stevens). 21 3 In
response, the Attorney General made the following historical
argument:
I would like to make a few commonplace observations about
the original document itself. It is easy to forget what a young
country America really is. The bicentennial of our independence was just a few years ago, that of the Constitution still
two years off. The period surrounding the creation of the
Constitution is not a dark and mythical realm. The young
America of the 1780's and 90's was a vibrant place, alive with
pamphlets, newspapers and books chronicling and commenting upon the great issues of the day. We know how the
209. See the useful compilation prepared by the Federalist Society, The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution (1986), and L. Caplan, the Tenth Justice

(1987).
210. Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese III, reproduced in The Great De-

bate, supra note 209, at 9.
211. Id., at 9-10.
212. Address by Justice William Brennan, reproduced in The Great Debate, supra

note 209, at 14.
213. Address byJusticeJohn Paul Stevens, reproduced in The Great Debate, supra
note 209, at 28.
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Founding Fathers lived, and much of what they read, thought,
and believed. The disputes and compromises of the Constitutional Convention were carefully recorded. The minutes of
the Convention are a matter of public record. Several of the
most important participants-including James Madison, the
"father" of the Constitution-wrote comprehensive accounts
of the convention. Others, Federalists and Anti-Federalists
alike, committed their arguments for and against ratification,
as well as their understandings of the Constitution, to paper,
so that their ideas and conclusions could be widely circulated,
read, and understood.
In short, the Constitution is not buried in the mists of
time. We know a tremendous amount of the history of its genesis. The Bicentennial is encouraging even more scholarship
about its origins. We know who did what, when, and many
times why. '2One
can talk intelligently about a "founding
14
generation.

Ironically, the Attorney General's delight that scholars are continuing their inquiries into the origins of the Constitution has not met with
ringing endorsements from the academic community. In fact, several
historians have complained that the cottage industry of original intent
scholarship and analysis 2 15 is diverting scholarly energies 21
from
explor6
ing the history of the Founding Period on its own terms.
In addition, two recent articles cast a bleak light on the original
intent controversy, offering little encouragement for those who believe
in the possibility of an identifiable, clear, and applicable intent of the
Framers about the meaning of constitutional provisions. James H.
Hutson's "The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record" 2 17 sets forth Dr. Hutson's reflections on his experience in preparing the Supplement to Max Farrand's Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787.218 Because Dr. Hutson's assessment of the basis of

original intent analysis-the actual documentary record of the framing,
adoption, first stages of implementation, and amendment of the Constitution in 1787-1791-strikes a mighty blow at the central assumption
of the argument for original intent analysis, it deserves extended
description.
Dr. Hutson turns, first, to the traditional questions raised about the
integrity and accuracy of James Madison's notes of the Convention.
214. Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese III, reproduced in The Great Debate, supra note 209, at 31-33.

215. See supra note 194.
216. See, e.g., Winkler, Scholarship: "Cerebral" Celebration of the Constitution's
Bicentennial Is Derided as an "Intellectual Bust," but Public-Education Programs Are
Hailed for Bringing Scholars Out from Behind Their Desks, Chron. Higher Educ., Mar.
4, 1987, at 6-8.
217. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary
Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1986).

218. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
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Originating with the late Professor William Winslow Crosskey of the
University of Chicago Law School, 219 the indictment of Madison runs
essentially as follows: Madison deliberately abridged and falsified his
notes of the Federal Convention and of key debates in the Confederation Congress to remove all evidence that the Convention was authorized to produce, and did knowingly produce, a unitary republic
granting Congress broad, sweeping powers over legislation and especially over commerce. Crosskey first aired these arguments in his 1953
magnum opus Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United
States.220 Despite a scathing counter-blast by Madison's principal biographer, Irving Brant, 2 2 ' Crosskey's allegations will not go away. 22 2 But
Dr. Hutson confirms that Brant's defense of Madison was sound223
Madison did not conduct later wholesale depredations on his Notes.
Dr. Hutson's findings concerning New York delegate and AntiFederalist Robert Yates's notes of the Convention are more disturbing.
Known as the Secret Proceedings,2 24 Yates's notes are usually considered
second only to Madison for what they reveal about the Convention until Yates and his colleague, John Lansing, departed for New York in
early July. The original manuscript of what Yates called his "exact
Journal ' 2 25 has long since disappeared, as has the manuscript of
Lansing's transcript of that original manuscript-the supposed basis for
the published 1821 edition of the Secret Proceedings.2 26 The editor of the
Secret Proceedings was Edmond Charles Gen~t, known to historians as
"Citizen Gen~t," the French diplomat whose pro-Revolution activities
in the early 17 90s were so disturbing to the Washington administration
that Genet was ultimately recalled. Knowing his likely fate at the hands
of the Revolutionary government in France, Gent instead settled in
New York and became a bitter opponent of Jefferson and Madison in
the early nineteenth century. Dr. Hutson discovered among Gen~t's
papers in the Library of Congress two pages of Lansing's original transcript of Yates's notes for 5 July 1787. When compared with the published version of that day's record in the Secret Proceedings, these
219. W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States
(1953). Volume 3, edited by Crosskey's student William Jeffrey, appeared in 1980.

220. 1id.
at 12-13, 313; 2 id. at 1009, 1012, 1020. See also Crosskey, The Ex-PostFacto and the Contracts Clauses in the Federal Convention: A Note on the Editorial
Ingenuity of James Madison, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 248 (1968). See the discussion in
Hutson, supra note 217, at 25-27.
221. Brant, Mr. Crosskey and Mr. Madison, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 443 (1954).
222. See Hutson, supra note 217, at 26-27 & nn.127-37.

223. Id. at 27-35.
224. R. Yates, Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled at
Philadelphia, in the Year 1787, for the Purpose of Forming the Constitution of the
United States of America (1821 & photo. reprint 1987).
225. Letter of Robert Yates to Abraham Yates, Jr., 1 June 1787; see also R.
Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 193. The letter appears in full in Supplement,

supra note 12, at 41-42.
226. Hutson, supra note 217, at 9-12; R. Yates, supra note 224, at 207.
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manuscript pages demonstrate that Genet doctored Yates's notes, suppressing half of the information that Yates recorded and garbling the
other half.22 7 If the balance of the Secret Proceedings bears the same rela-

tionship to the original manuscript, now lost, then we cannot regard
Yates's published Secret Proceedings as an accurate source for what happened in the Federal Convention.
Dr. Hutson's most important point focuses on the quality-or lack
of quality-of parliamentary reporting in the Founding Period.
Madison emerges as perhaps the best American parliamentary reporter
of his time. Yet, in admittedly unscientific experiments using his colleagues and a stopwatch, Dr. Hutson suggests that Madison was able to
record only seven to ten percent of what was said in the Convention. 22 8
In large part, Madison probably summarized the arguments that delegates presented; on occasion, it appears, he also expanded arguments
contained in embryo in his speeches as actually delivered. 22 9 Even with
these faults, Madison is still without peer as a recorder of debates in
this period. By contrast, Dr. Hutson describes the work of Thomas
Lloyd, the alcoholic journalist who was hired to take down the debates
in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, botched the job, and then assumed the same task for the House of Representatives' debates in the
First Congress. 23 0 One of the starkest and most disturbing sections of
Dr. Hutson's article, his analysis of Lloyd's work is accompanied by a
photograph reproducing a typical page of Lloyd's shorthand record of
the House's 1789 debates-a page more notable for his caricature of an
unknown politician and his sketch of a running horse than for his record of what was said on the floor of the House. Dr. Hutson also assembles a disquieting collection of quotations indicating most
Representatives' low opinions of the published record of their debates
during the First Congress. In sum, he suggests, we build on sand if we
treat the surviving records of debates in the Federal Convention, the
state ratifying conventions, or the House of Representatives in the First
Congress-the body that, among other things, framed the Bill of
Rights 23 1'-as accurate verbatim transcipts enabling us to ascertain the
original intent of the Framers, ratifiers, or Representatives.
If Dr. Hutson's article casts doubt on our ability to get at evidence
of original intent, H. Jefferson Powell's essay, "The Original Understanding of Original Intent,"' 23 2 suggests that we may face profound
intellectual difficulties in that pursuit as well. Drawing on a vast body of
227. Id. at 14-19.
228. Id. at 31, 33-35.
229. Id. at 35.
230. Id. at 35-38.
231. See 4 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, supra note 24, at
1-48 (1986); R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 261-71 and sources cited at
318-19 nn.36-53.
232. Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885
(1985).
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sources to outline the hermeneutical theories of the Revolutionary generation, Professor Powell argues that the Framers of the Constitution
and their contemporaries did not intend their personal understandings
of the meanings of constitutional provisions to be binding on the people or on posterity. 23 3 His study also examines the political and intellectual controversies of the late 1790s and 1800s to elucidate the
origins of what the Framers and their contemporaries would have
dubbed "original intent analysis"-but he concludes that that method
of interpretation differs significantly from what we would mean by the
term today.2 3 4 Professor Powell's persuasive analysis of this question
suggests that a truly consistent application of original intent analysis
would swallow its own tail and, ultimately, itself. It remains only to add
that scholarly study "original intent" generates historical evidence and
interpretations in response to litigants' or policymakers' demands and
dissipates valuable
scholarly energies that would be better applied
2 35
elsewhere.
III. WORKS FOR THE GENERAL READER

When we turn to those books specifically addressed to readers
without scholarly background, the quality fluctuates wildly.
Two fine introductions to the Constitution for the general reader
address the Constitution's origins as well as its substance. How FreeAre
We? What the ConstitutionSays We Can and Cannot Do, byJohn Sexton and
Nat Brandt, 23 6 is an excellent introductory guide to American constitutional history and law, arranged in question-and-answer format by a
professor of constitutional law at New York University School of Law
and a former editor of American Heritage and The New York Times Book
Review. The book is divided into two parts: "Our Federal System,"
which covers the origins of the Constitution, the amending process, the
three branches of the federal government, and the states, and "Our
Rights and Liberties." Each chapter includes several questions, each of
which is answered in a brief essay of one to four pages. The authors'
treatment of the origins of the Constitution is well grounded in the recent scholarly literature, and is particularly good on the connection between the making of the Constitution and the development of
American national identity. The selection of subjects is imaginative,
233. Id. at 888-902.
234. Id. at 924-47. Powell argues essentially as follows: In the 1790s, as the Republican party coalesced in opposition to the Federalists, they propounded a theory of

constitutional interpretation using what looks to us like the "buzz words" of original
intent analysis. A careful examination of their arguments reveals, however, that by this
language they meant to describe the Constitution as a compact, and the intent at issue
was that of the contracting parties-that is, the states as political entities, not the individuals who framed or adopted the Constitution. Id.
235. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
236. J. Sexton & N. Brandt, How Free Are We? What the Constitution Says We
Can and Cannot Do (1986).
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ranging from the origins of the national Election Day to the history of
attempts to force the calling of a second constitutional convention.
The book includes extensive citations to leading constitutional cases
237
and a good short bibliography. The U.S. Constitution for Eveiyone
presents the text of the Constitution with extensive annotations explaining the origins and meaning of the document and supplementing
it with pithy quotations and lively drawings. An entertaining first book
on the Constitution, it painlessly instills a substantial quantity of useful
information about the Constitution's history and meaning.
Two biographies of key figures in the making of the Constitution
figure prominently among the good books addressed to general read2 38
ers. Robert A. Rutland bases his new biography of James Madison
on his decades of study of the Founding Period and, in particular, his
experience as editor of The Papers of James Madison.2 3 9 The only fulllength modern study of Madison now in print, James Madison: The
FoundingFatherderives its strengths-and some weaknesses-from Professor Rutland's immersion in his subject. Professor Rutland clearly
admires Madison; on occasion, his admiration leads him to offer too
friendly or charitable an analysis of Madison's actions and motivations.
For example, in discussing the dispute over the location of the permanent national capital, Professor Rutland is quick to stigmatize
Northerners' motives for fixing the site at or near New York City or
Philadelphia, but assumes that Madison and his allies had none but disinterested, virtuous reasons for their campaign to locate the capital in
the area near the Potomac River. If the Northerners wanted the capital
to be close to centers of finance and speculation to facilitate lobbying,
the Southerners also wanted to ensure that the capital would be accessible to Southern agricultural interests. 2 40 Professor Rutland has structured his book in a seemingly lopsided fashion-beginning in October
of 1787 and sketching Madison's first thirty-six years in a series of backward glances and referential flashbacks. This unconventional methodology unavoidably slights critical stages of Madison's career and the
development of his ideas about politics, government, and society. But,
in return, Professor Rutland offers us a fine overview and interpretation
of Madison as one of the principal political leaders in the new nation-a
pivotal figure in the process of adjusting American politics to the Constitution. Moreover, Professor Rutland has crafted an account as politically knowledgeable and perceptive and as exciting as the best of
237. U. Agel &] M. Gerberg, The U.S. Constitution for Everyone (1987).
238. R. Rutland, James Madison: The Founding Father (1987); see also R.
Rutland, C. Jones & K. Rice, James Madison and the Search for Nationhood (1981).
239. Supra note 35.
240. R. Rutland, supra note 238, at 68-83, 88-91. Cf. R. Bernstein with K. Rice,
supra note 2, at 253-55; K. Bowling, Politics in the First Congress, 1789-1791, at
152-99 (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Wisc.).
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Theodore H. White's Making of the President volumes 2 4 1-or Professor
24 2
Rutland's own classic The Ordeal of the Constitution.
Like Jefferson, Madison began his political career with regard and
admiration for Patrick Henry-and, again like Jefferson, Madison soon
lost his enthusiasm for the "backwoods Demosthenes." Jefferson and
Madison cooled towards Henry for several reasons. They resented
Henry's disinclination to buckle down to the business of government.
They also disliked but grudgingly admired Henry's ability to throw up
legalistic and political roadblocks to policies favoring national rather
than local interests. They frowned upon (perhaps enviously) Henry's
extraordinary skills in mustering and directing popular opinion, enthusiasm, and suspicion. Too, the Virginia aristocrats may have felt some
snobbish disdain for Henry, a self-made and largely self-taught lawyer
from the western frontier who defended the interests and expressed the
beliefs and concerns of the "common folk" from whom he sprang.
Henry Mayer stresses this aspect of Henry's life and character in A Son
2 43
of Thunder: Patrick Henry and the American Republic.
Mr. Mayer's biography is especially welcome during the Bicentennial as a rare full-scale study of one of the Constitution's leading opponents. Indeed, Mr. Mayer offers his study as a challenge to the
prevailing veneration of the framers and supporters of the Constitution.2 44 In a sense, his rejection of the "miracle of Philadelphia '

24 5

view of the making of the Constitution is outdated; instead of a lonely
challenge to received wisdom, A Son of Thunder is but one of several new
studies of the Anti-Federal movement reevaluating the ratification controversy. 24 6 Readers of Mr. Mayer's lively, well-written, impassioned
book should keep in mind that Mr. Mayer views the world and the Constitution through his subject's eyes, rather than offering a cooler, disinterested assessment of what gap, if any, there was between the way
things were and the way Henry saw them. In Mr. Mayer's defense, it
should be pointed out that most earlier accounts of the making of the
Constitution err in the same manner but in the opposite direction; A
Son of Thunder energetically sets out to redress the balance.
A neglected book of a few years ago is of special interest for the
Bicentennial, as it makes accessible to the general reader one of the
more important trends in historical scholarship of recent years.
241. T. White, The Making of the President 1960 (1961); T. White, The Making of
the President 1964 (1965); T. White, The Making of the President 1968 (1969); T.
White, The Making of the President 1972 (1973); T. White, Breach of Faith: The Fall of

Richard Nixon (1975).
242. R. Rutland, The Ordeal of the Constitution (1966).

243. H. Mayer, A Son of Thunder: Patrick Henry and the American Republic
(1986).
244. Id. at xv, 374-95.
245. Id. at xv.
246. See supra notes 17-21, 145, 148, 153, 160, 162, 163, 169-89 and accompanying text.
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William Everdell's The End of Kings: A History of Republics and Republi2 48
cans247 performs for our time the service that Machiavelli's Discourses
orJohn Adams' Defence of the Constitutions of Government 249 performed for
their periods. It is an intelligent, clearly written survey of republicanism in theory and practice throughout the history of Western civilization, ranging from the ancient Greeks and Romans to the late Senator
Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
Witnesses at the Creation 250 is Richard B. Morris's engaging group
biography of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, the
three authors of The Federalist. Professor Morris ties together the lives,
experiences, and developing political theories of the men behind
Publius in a good introduction for the general reader to the background of The Federalist. In this connection, it should be noted that
Professor Morris's The Forging of the Union 25 1 is also accessible to the
intelligent general reader, as are several other books addressed primarily to a scholarly audience-The Framing
and Ratification of the Constitution
52
2
and The Reluctant Pillaramong them.

One aspect of the Bicentennial offering the hope of building
bridges between the scholarly community and a more general audience
is the series of major historical exhibitions- some of which have also
produced companion volumes-at important research libraries
throughout the nation. The New York Public Library's Constitution Bicentennial Project is one example; 25 3 another is The New-York Historical Society's exhibition and companion volume honoring the
Bicentennial. Written by the exhibition's curator, Dr. Elizabeth
McCaughey, 2 54 Government by Choice: Inventing the United States Constitution 2 55 is a concise, handsomely produced analysis of the Federal Convention and interpretation of "the Founders' Prescription for Good
Government. ' 2 56 Dr. McCaughey offers a clear, generally reliable account of the work of the Convention, interspersed with digressions
247. W. Everdell, The End of Kings: A History of Republics and Republicans
(1983).

248. N. Machiavelli, The Discourses (L. Walker trans., B. Crick ed. 1970).
249. J. Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States
(reprint 1979) (London 1787-88).

250. R. Morris, Witnesses at the Creation: Hamilton, Madison,Jay, and the Constitution (1985).
251. R. Morris, supra note 75.
252. The Framing and Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 188; The Reluc-

tant Pillar: New York and the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, supra note 189; see
also Winkler, supra note 216.

253. See R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2.
254. Dr. McCaughey is the author of a major biography of William Samuel John-

son. E. McCaughey, From Loyalist to Founding Father: The Political Odyssey of William SamuelJohnson (1980).
255. E. McCaughey, Government by Choice: Inventing the United States Constitution (1987).
256. Id. at 79.
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describing such matters as the issue of a bill of rights in the ratification
2 57
controversy.
As usual with a subject as large and complex as the making of the
Constitution, it is possible to find points of disagreement. Dr.
McCaughey's discussion of the many problems confronting the Confederation does not address the tendency to minimize or downplay
these concerns by those who later became Anti-Federalists.2 58 Also, it
is questionable whether there was an identifiable group of "Madisonians" at the Convention-that is, a group of delegates led by Madison
and acting as a coherent, consciously organized group. 25 9 She claims
that the Framers' concerns to find virtuous, independent, public-spirited men to hold office under the new Constitution had no elements of
class feeling, 2 60 but she overlooks the Framers' tendency to equate independence with ownership of at least a certain amount of property-a
point of view that arguably has some tincture of class about it. Most
jarring are Dr. McCaughey's occasional efforts to evaluate modem society and government by reference to the expectations and intentions of
the Framers. 26 1 In light of such a sweeping example of judicial review
as Trevelt v. Weeden, 26 2 in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court invalidated the state's paper money laws as unconstitutional despite the lack
of any provision of the revamped colonial charter having anything to do
with the issue, 26 3 it is hard to credit Dr. McCaughey's assertion that the
Framers would have been shaken by judicial exercises of discretion going beyond the written text of the Constitution; after all, Trevett v.
Weeden, when mentioned at all in the Convention, was mentioned favorably. 2 64 Furthermore, Dr. McCaughey offers no documentation for her

attacks on "judicial activism" as contrary to the Framers' expectations.
On a more practical level, Dr. McCaughey has been poorly served by
her publisher, for Government by Choice lacks a table of contents, a table
of illustrations, and an index.
Nevertheless, Government by Choice is a welcome addition to the literature of the Bicentennial and the historiography of the Founding Period. Especially noteworthy are Dr. McCaughey's provocative analysis
of the Framers' understanding of such conceptions as virtue and representation and the relationship between them, and her challenging argu257. Id. at 72-74.
258. Id. at 13-16.

259. Id. at 36, 39, 40-41, 46.
260. Id. at 86-87.
261. Id. at 32, 62, 68, 84.

262. See J. Varnum, The Case, Trevett Against Weeden .... (Providence, R.I.
1787) at 1-36.
263. I. Polishook, Rhode Island and the Union, 1774-1795, at 133-42 (1969); R.
Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 91-92.

264. See, e.g., 2 Records, supra note 11, at 27-28 (James Madison's remarks on 17
July 1787); see also C. Warren, Congress, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court 44 &

n.2 (1925).
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ment that the Framers principally sought to identify and implement a
theory of leadership to ensure that the government they created would
be staffed by those sincerely committed to achieving the public
good.265

Unfortunately, most of the other books about the Constitution for
a general readership do not measure up to the standard of these books.
The Bicentennial follows the pattern of earlier Constitutional anniversaries in generating "constitutional devotionals"-hortatory books
claiming to recover and present the central principles of the Constitution, guiding the American people away from constitutional heresies of
various sorts. 2 66 This year's contribution to this category are Mortimer
Adler's We Hold These Truths: Understandingthe Ideas and Ideals of the Constitution2 67 and Walter Berns's Taking the Constitution Seriously.2 68 Both
books come highly recommended-Justice Harry Blackmun introduces
Professor Adler's book, and Professor Berns's flaunts encomiums from
scholars and public officials, including Henry J. Abraham, Michael
Novak, and William Bradford Reynolds. 2 69 But Professors Adler and
Berns are not historians. This is not to say that only historians are
qualified to write about the Constitution and its origins. Still, the flaws
of fact and analysis besetting both books result from their authors'
abandoning of historical methods and inattention to matters of basic
2 70
historical fact.

Of the two books, Taking the Constitution Seriously is more original
and challenging. Professor Berns sets out to establish continuities of
thought and principle between the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution. The book's essential flaw is that Professor Berns
wants to find in the Constitution more philosophical consistency and
rigor than the document may contain. Not even Professor Berns's gifts
for graceful writing and vigorous argument can demonstrate convincingly that the Constitution embodied from the first a consistent, systematic body of ideas about government, natural law, and individual
rights. This central intellectual difficulty is compounded, moreover, by
Professor Berns's failure to take account of the actual history underlying the Constitution. For example, as part of his discussion of the place
of representation in the constitutional system, he claims that "represen265. E. McCaughey, supra note 255, at 79-94.

266. See, e.g.,J. Beck, The Constitution of the United States: Yesterday, Todayand Tomorrow? (1924); H. McBain, The Living Constitution: A Consideration of the
Realities and Legends of Our Fundamental Law (1927); A. Southworth, The Common
Sense of the Constitution of the United States (1924). M. Kammen, supra note 10, cites
dozens of examples.
267. M. Adler, We Hold These Truths: Understanding the Ideas and Ideals of the
Constitution (1987).
268. W. Berns, Taking the Constitution Seriously (1987).
269. Id. at back dust jacket.

270. On Adler, see Peck, Adler Book Misleads Public on Constitution, ABA Passport to Legal Understanding, Summer 1987, at 7.
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tative government is characterized by speech whose purpose is to gain
the consent of others" 27 1 and that the speech and debate clause 2 72 was
intended to protect the "right [of Senators and Representatives] to
speak with a view to gaining consent. '2 73 He further contends that this
clause was part of the Framers' plan "to put some distance-but some
'republican' distance- between the people and their representatives." 274 The problem here is that Professor Berns overlooks the origins of the speech and debate clause in the seventeenth-century
struggles by the House of Commons for parliamentary privilege to protect their members from reprisals by the Crown for exercising their
freedom of legislative debate on matters of Crown policy. 27 5
At another point, seeking to attack the legitimacy of Supreme
Court decisions striking down state laws under the fourteenth amendment, Professor Berns asserts that the amendment's due process and
2 76
equal protection clauses simply do not apply to state legislatures.
Rather, the due process clause supposedly limits state courts, and the
equal protection clause supposedly restricts members of the states' executive branches. Professor Berns claims this to be a clear and unavoidable result of a literal reading of the text of the amendment, but the
text nowhere substantiates his assertion. 27 7 It imposes its several restrictions on states, not on any particular branch or subdivision of the
state government. Even more disconcerting, Professor Berns seems to
have forgotten the supremacy clause, which specifically enshrines the
Constitution as "the supreme Law of the Land" (which all state officers
are bound to uphold by oath or affirmation), "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary Notwithstanding." 27 8 Article VI would seem to supply any arguable deficiency of federal judicial
power over state legislatures under the fourteenth amendment, but
Professor Berns does not mention it, either in this context or anywhere
else in his book.
What has gone wrong in Taking the Constitution Seriously ? Professor
Berns, writing from the standpoint of a political philosopher, has let his
hunt for consistency and system run away with him. Used to analyzing
a given text as a carefully thought-out presentation of a consistent argument about politics, he applies these skills to a document that did not
originate in that way at all, as Professor McDonald has shown in Novus
271. W. Berns, supra note 268, at 144.
272. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6.
273. W. Berns, supra note 268, at 144.
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., C. Wittke, A History of Parliamentary Privilege (1938); M. Clarke,
Parliamentary Privilege in the American Colonies (1943).
276. W. Berns, supra note 268, at 212.
277. For another example of Berns's literalism failing to take account of historical
evidence, see Finkelman, supra note 150, at 218-19 n.87.
2, 3.
278. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
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Ordo Seclorum. 2 79 The paradox lurking at the heart of Taking the Constitution Seriously is that, while Professor Berns emphasizes that the only appropriate way to interpret the Constitution is to give effect to the
intentions of its Framers, he treats this history selectively, using only
that which fits his philosophical agenda and discarding the rest as
irrelevant.
Most of the other books on the origins of the Constitution focus on
the admittedly dramatic story of the Federal Convention. For example,
several publishers have reissued older studies of the Convention. Yale
University Press has kept Max Farrand's competent, bland The Framing
of the Constitutionof the United States in print ever since its first appearance
in 1913.280 Little, Brown has republished Catherine Drinker Bowen's
well-written, uncritical Miracle at Philadelphiawith a new, admiring introduction by former Chief Justice Burger. 2 8 1 Penguin has revived Carl
Van Doren's graceful The Great Rehearsal, which in 1946 was intended to
advance the case for world federation by reference to the Americans'

experience in 1787.282
By far the best of these revived books-and still the best book on
the Federal Convention for scholarly and general readers alike-is
Clinton Rossiter's 1966 study 1787: The Grand Convention, which W.W.
Norton has returned to print with a new introduction by Richard B.
Morris. 28 3 Rossiter's study is the finest of the Convention books because he treats the intellectual side of constitution-making seriously
without sacrificing the details of color, personality, and drama that intrigue the general reader. He also sets the Convention in context, providing useful sketches of the conditions at home and abroad facing the
United States in 1787, the struggle for ratification and the first years of
the Constitution, and the last years of the Framers. He presents the
most perceptive analysis of the shifting coalitions within the Convention and the most acute evaluations of the background, abilities, and
performances of the delegates. With such a high standard to meet, it is
little wonder that Rossiter's study is still unmatched, more than twenty
years after its first appearance.
William Peters's A More Perfect Union,2 84 and Bill Moyers's Moyers:
Report from Philadelphia2 85 are, on the whole, the best of the new
books-in large part because they stick to the story presented in Far279. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
280. M. Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (1913).
281. C. Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia (bicentennial ed. 1986). The work first appeared in 1966.
282. See C. Van Doren, The Great Rehearsal (1986). The work first appeared in
1946.
283. C. Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention (1987). The work first appeared in
1966.
284. W. Peters, A More Perfect Union (1987).
285. B. Moyers, Moyers: Report from Philadelphia (1987). In the interests of full
disclosure: I was a historical consultant to the original television project.
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rand's Records without straining for dramatic effect. Peters disclaims
larger intellectual ambitions, seeking only to write a lucid narrative of
the work of the Convention. He allows the structure of his work to be
determined by that of the Convention's debates, occasionally injecting
brief descriptions of later constitutional controversies rooted in
problems that preoccupied the Framers. The book maintains a firm
hold on the course of the debate, so that despite its lack of footnotes
the interested reader can find the debate under discussion in Madison's
notes or Farrand's Records with little effort. A More Perfect Union permits
us to retire Max Farrand's Framing of the Constitution; it is now the best
unadorned narrative of the Convention available. Moyers's book is
unique among the works discussed here, in that it is the permanent
record of a television project. Moyers and his colleagues prepared
ninety three-minute reports for public television, each recounting the
day's events at the Federal Convention, with reflections on larger issues
and problems facing the United States in 1787. The project had its
limitations, of course-three minutes in television equals no more than
two double-spaced typewritten pages written under severe constraints
dictated by the medium. Nonetheless, these accurate, incisive, and sensitive essays, accompanied by excellent illustrations by Burton
Silverman, are a fine introduction to the work of the Convention, especially as Moyers and his colleagues declare their purpose to be to stimulate their readers to read further and explore the story of the making of
the Constitution for themselves.
Much inferior not only to Rossiter, Peters, and Moyers but to Farrand, Van Doren, and even Bowen are The Genius of the People, by
28 7
Like PeCharles L. Mee, Jr., 28 6 and The Founding, by Fred Barbash.
ters, Mee and Barbash seek only to tell the story of the Convention
without setting it in its larger intellectual and political context. But
neither Mee nor Barbash has Peters's ability to tell the story accurately
and responsibly or his confidence in its inherent interest. Both writers
veer between treating the making of the Constitution as a pork-barrel
session of small-time political bosses and spewing forth clouds of incense around the marble statues of the Framers. Mee unconvincingly
represents the Convention as a battle between Madisonites (large-state
delegates led by James Madison of Virginia) and Shermanites (smallstate delegates led by Roger Sherman of Connecticut), showing no
sensitivity to the fluidity with which the various groupings of delegates
dissolved and coalesced during the summer of 1787. Barbash has a
surer sense of this characteristic of the debates, but unintentionally garbles other matters of fact, such as the internal divisions within the New
York delegation, in his superheated narrative. Other errors of fact, major and minor, and puzzling lacunae mar both books. The most as286. C. Mee, The Genius of the People (1987).
287. F. Barbash, The Founding: A Dramatic Account of the Writing of the Constitution (1987).
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tounding is Barbash's omission of the climatic exchange of 16July 1787
between Edmund Randolph and William Paterson that nearly destroyed the fragile consensus of the Great Compromise. 28 8 Neither
book comes to grips with the ratification controversy, in which many of
the leading Framers found themselves obliged to reconsider and explain the document they had drafted at Philadelphia. Especially with
the outpouring of new primary sources and monographs on ratification,
Mee and Barbash have no excuse for shortchanging the subject this
28 9
way.
In return for their clumsy, sketchy treatments of the intellectual
dimension of the Convention, Mee and Barbash serve up stale rehashes
of the "human" details of the Convention and of staple Convention
anecdotes. In sum, these books sould be avoided, for they offer nothing of value to anyone interested in learning about the Federal
Convention.
The most disappointing of the new books on the Federal Convention is Decision in Philadelphia,by Christopher Collier and James Lincoln
Collier. 2 90 Christopher Collier is State Historian of Connecticut and
the author of a solid biography of Roger Sherman; 29 ' James Lincoln
Collier is notable primarily for his distinguished studies of American
jazz. 29 2 Together, they have also produced several well-received historical novels about the American Revolution for young adult readers. 2 93 At first glance, Decision at Philadelphiapromised to measure up to
the quality of its authors' other books, and, indeed, to challenge
Clinton Rossiter's 1787 for primacy. Drawing on the most recent
scholarship (by contrast, Rossiter's study appeared before the publica2
tion of Bernard Bailyn's Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 94
2
95
and Gordon S. Wood's Creation of the American Republic and the host
of other studies spawned in their wake 2 96 ), Decision in Philadelphia
288. Compare, e.g., id. at 120-21 with 2 Records, supra note 11, at 18-20;C. Rossiter, supra note 283, at 194-96, and R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 167-68.
289. C. Mee, supra note 286, at 284-306 ; F. Barbash, supra note 287, at 209-11.
For an overview of the literature, see the sources cited in R. Bernstein with K. Rice,
supra note 2, at 310-15; see also H. Storing, supra notes 20, 21; supra notes 17-19, 145,
148, 153, 160, 162, 163, 167-89 and accompanying text.
290. C. Collier &J. Collier, Decision in Philadelphia: The Constitutional Convention of 1787 (1986). In fairness, it should be noted that both Moyers and Peters also
slight ratification.
291. C. Collier, Roger Sherman's Connecticut: Yankee Politics and the American
Revolution (1971).
292. See, e.g., J. Collier, Duke Ellington (1987).
293. See, e.g.,J. Collier & C. Collier, My Brother Sam is Dead (1974).
294. B. Bailyn, supra note 3.
295. G. Wood, supra note 3.
296. See generally Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of
an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 Wm. & Mary (3d
ser.) Q. 49-80 (1972); Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39
Wm. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 334-56 (1982).
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presents superb brief accounts of some of the intellectual issues at the
heart of the making of the Constitution and excellent character studies
of many leading delegates, such as George
Washington, Elbridge
2 97
Gerry, Luther Martin, and James Wilson.
Nonetheless, this book is marred by disturbing lapses in scholarship. The most serious has to do with James Madison and Charles
Pinckney. Following the lead of such partisans of Pinckney as S. Sidney
Ulmer, the Colliers maintain that Pinckney was the true framer of the
Constitution and that Madison suppressed the South Carolinian's role
out of unbridled distaste and jealousy. 2 98 They rehash the old allegations that Madison deliberately refused to record Pinckney's speech of
29 May 1787 proposing his outline of a new Constitution and all later
occasions when Pinckney spoke about his ideas. The detective work of
J. Franklin Jameson and Andrew C. McLaughlin in the late nineteenth
century29 9 demolished "Constitutional Charlie's" claims and cast grave
doubts on his honesty as well. Despite the fame of the Jameson and
McLaughlin articles, and even though most historians of the Convention have accepted their findings as authoritative,30 0 the Colliers revive
the old South Carolinian case for Charles Pinckney, citing the Jameson
and McLaughlin studies to substantiate their claims. Similarly, the
Colliers cite an exchange of letters between Washington and Madison
denouncing Pinckney 30 1 but omit the reason for the letters: Pinckney's
publication, in October 1787, of a pamphlet setting forth some of his
speeches in the Convention, which both Washington
and Madison
30 2
deemed a breach of the delegates' oath of secrecy.
The Colliers also accept uncritically the arguments of Staughton
Lynd that a detailed agreement was secretly worked out between the
South Carolina and Connecticut delegates, who then rammed through
the Convention their shared understandings about navigation rights
297. C. Collier & J. Collier, supra note 290, at 30-42 (Washington), 234-48
(Gerry), 116-21 (Martin), 206-16 (Wilson).
298. Id. at 64-74. See also Ulmer, Charles Pinckney: Father of the Constitution?,
10 S.C.L.Q 225, 249 (1958) (suggesting "that Charles Pinckney evidently made a
greater contribution to the Federal Constitution than has been generally recognized.");
Ulmer, James Madison and the Pinckney Plan, 9 S.C.L.Q. 415 (1957) (arguing that
Madison's criticisms of the Pinckney draft do not conclusively show that Pinckney's contributions were minimal); C. Nott, The Mystery of the Pinckney Draught (1908) (asserting that a great deal of the work on the Constitution must have been Pinckney's).
299. Jameson, Portions of Charles Pinckney's Plan for a Constitution, 1787, 8 Am.
Hist. Rev. 509 (1903); McLaughlin, Sketch of Pinckney's Plan for a Constitution, 1787, 9
Am. Hist. Rev. 735 (1904).
300. See, e.g., 3 Records, supra note 11, at 595-609; C. Rossiter, supra note 283,
at 132, 171, 331; R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2, at 158, 306 n.17.
301. C. Collier &J. Collier, supra note 290, at 69.
302. C. Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted to the Federal Convention (New York 1787), reprinted in 3 Records, supra note 11, at 106-23.
For Madison's and Washington's comments, see 3 Records, supra note 11, at 123, 131.
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and the slave trade.A0 3 Most analysts of the Convention agree that the
delegates argued, fought, and dealt their way into a compromise with
no clear sense of what the final result would be.3 0 4 And the Colliers

accept charges against Madison that he repeatedly tinkered with his
notes, rendering them suspect as a source for the work of the Convention, despite the repeated exonerations of Madison by Irving Brant and
others.3 0 5 In the end, although it has substantial virtues, the flaws of
Decision in Philadelphia cripple its claims to be a reliable account of the
work of the Federal Convention.
Finally, several publishers have joined the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution in issuing editions of the
Constitution for a general audience. Of these, perhaps the most elaborate is that prepared by calligrapher and artist Sam Fink;30 6 this large
volume reproduces the text of the Constitution in "poster" form,
lightly sprinkled with historical facts and portraits of some of the leading Framers. The book also includes a perfunctory introduction by
James Michener. Rather more convenient in size is the Bicentennial Keepsake Edition.30 7 Accompanying the text of the Constitution are "essays
and commentary" by President Reagan, former Chief Justice Burger,
former Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill, Senator Robert Dole,
and former Senator Charles McC. Mathias, billed as the leading Senatorial expert on the Constitution.3 0 8 Mr. Mathias is entrusted with this
edition's account of the Constitution, but his essay, too, is plagued by
misreadings of the history of the document and the problems of sover30 9
eignty under the Articles of Confederation.

IV.

THE CONSTITUTION AS PUBLIC EDUCATOR:

A Machine That Would Go of Itself
The Constitution is at the same time a charter of government and a
national symbol. Among its symbolic functions is public education: the
Constitution and the public officials charged with interpreting and applying its provisions are supposed to instill the basic principles of
American constitutionalism in the minds and hearts of the American
303. C. Collier &J. Collier, supra note 290, at 137-79 (especially 160-65 on Lynd).
304. See, e.g., R. Bernstein with K. Rice, supra note 2,at 175-78 and sources cited
at 308-09 nn.56-64.
305. Compare C. Collier &J. Collier, supra note 290, at 66-67, 69, 81 with Hutson, supra note 217, at 27-33 (and sources cited therein).
306. S. Fink, The Constitution of the United States of America (1985).

307. The Constitution of the United States of America: The Bicentennial Keepsake
Edition (B. Preiss & J. Osterlund eds. 1987) [hereinafter Constitution: Keepsake
Edition].

308. Id. at front dust flap.
309. Compare Mathias, The Story of the Constitution, in Constitution: Keepsake
Edition, supra note 307, at 85-111 (Articles of Confederation made "[t]he colonies separate and independent nations") with R. Morris, supra note 75, at 55-79, (arguing that
national sovereignty preceded the creation of the states).
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people. Most constitutional scholars have focused on the first of the

Constitution's functions-as a charter
of government; only a few have
3 10
taken note of its symbolic functions.
Since 1945, the rise of the discipline of American Studies has
helped to develop techniques and intellectual models for assessing the
developing symbolic roles and functions of a person, idea, event, or
institution in the minds of the American people. For example, we have
distinguished studies of "the Jefferson image in the American
mind,"' 3 1' the development of George Washington as an American
symbol,3 12 and "Andrew Jackson [as a] symbol for [his] age," 3 13 as well
as Garry Wills's examinations of more recent political figures such as
Richard Nixon, 3 14 the Kennedy family,3 15 and Ronald Reagan.3 16 In A
Season of Youth, Professor Michael Kammen examined the changing importance of the American Revolution as a symbolic event. 3 17 This ear-

lier book presaged his current study, winner of the 1987 Parkman Prize,
A Machine That Would Go of Itself" The Constitution in American Culture, the
single most innovative study published for the Bicentennial.3 18
This book deserves separate discussion, not only because Professor Kammen has invented a new field of constitutional history, but also
because his study suggests that the fragmented and discordant character of the Bicentennial of the Constitution is nothing new. He explores
what might be called cultural constitutional history: the study of the
Constitution's place in the minds of ordinary Americans or the writings
of legal and constitutional scholars addressed to ordinary Americans.
Professor Kammen surveys the vast, often confused literature of American popular constitutionalism, drawing on articles in popular journals
and constitutional primers, records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's citizenship tests and of the Constitution Centennial and
Sesquicentennial Commissions, opinion polls, political cartoons and
history paintings, and the public and private writings of such constitutional sages and prophets as Andrew C. McLaughlin, Max Farrand, J.
Franklin Jameson, James M. Beck, Albert J. Beveridge, Edward S.
Corwin, and Sol Bloom.
310. M. Kammen, supra note 10, passim; Lemer, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 Yale L.J. 1290 (1937); Corwin, The Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol,
30 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1087 (1936), reprinted in 1 E. Corwin, supra note 99, at 168-79;
Corwin, The Worship of the Constitution, 4 Const. Rev. 3 (1920), reprinted in 1 E.
Corwin, supra note 99, at 47-55.
311. M. Peterson, The Jefferson Image in the American Mind (1962).
312. B. Schwartz, George Washington: The Making of an American Symbol
(1987); G. Wills, Cincinnatus: George Washington and the Enlightenment (1984).
313. J. Ward, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age (1955).
314. G. Wills, Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man (1979).
315. G. Wills, The Kennedy Imprisonment: A Meditation on Power (1982).
316. G. Wills, Reagan's America (1987).
317. M. Kammen, A Season of Youth: The American Revolution and the Historical
Imagination (1978).
318. M. Kammen, supra note 10.
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Professor Kammen's most immediately relevant chapters, for those
immersed in the Bicentennial, focus on the Centennial of 1887-1889
and the Sesquicentennial of 1937-1939. In each case, he demonstrates,
hucksterism, misinformation, manipulation for evanescent political advantage, and strident localism managed to mar the anniversary, hampering its usefulness as an opportunity for educating the public about
the origins and meaning of the Constitution. Professor Kammen's account describes a sobering legacy for Bicentennial planners, many of
whom all too clearly have not profited from his scholarship and
warnings.
Professor Kammen argues that the American people have, and
have long had, only the faintest understanding of the terms of the Constitution, of its central principles, its origins, and the ways in which the
system of government created by the Constitution is supposed to function. To be sure, as Kammen shows, at times of constitutional crisis the
American people reassert their claims to the Constitution and participate directly and often with a high degree of knowledge and sophistication in resolving such crises. Nonetheless, to the extent that we expect
the Constitution to perform its symbolic functions as public educator
unaided, we expect what never was and never can be.
Why has this happened? Professor Kammen identifies several reasons: the ambiguities inherent in the Constitution itself, the public tendency to confuse the Supreme Court with the Constitution, the
generally fumbling and uncertain news coverage of developments in
constitutional law, and the metaphors- covenant, mechanical, and organic-that judges, politicians, and other commentators have used to
explain and celebrate the Constitution- two functions not necessarily
complementary. He correctly suggests that the mechanical metaphor is
a particularly significant source of this gulf between the Constitution's
constitutive success and its educative and inculcative failure. The
Framers may have instructed us too well. Their emphasis on
Newtonian balance in the original system has helped to foster a metaphorical understanding of the Constitution as "a machine that would
go of itself." Professor Kammen finds particularly enlightening this
passage by James Russell Lowell in an 1888 essay from which he drew
his title:
After our Constitution got fairly into working order it really
seemed as if we had invented a machine that would go of itself,
and this begot a faith in our luck which even the civil war itself
but momentarily disturbed. Circumstances continued
favorable, and our prosperity went on increasing. I admire the
splendid complacency of my countrymen, and find something
exhilarating and inspiring in it. We are a nation which has
struck ile [sic], but we are also a nation that is sure the well will
never run dry. And this confidence in our luck with the absorption in material interests, generated by unparalleled opportunity, has in some respects made us neglectful of our
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political duties. 31 9
Lowell's observation touches upon another point, one that Professor Kammen barely discusses. In the past several decades, the American people have developed an increasing distance from, and lack of
interest in, American politics. We have seen several attempts to explain
this phenomenon. Some focus on the judiciary, claiming that judicial
activism has sapped the people's respect for the political system.
Others point to the wholesale disillusionment resulting from a series of
failed administrations, government scandals, and crises both foreign
and domestic. Still others echo Lowell's suggestion that material prosperity distracts the citizenry from things political-an ancient and honorable doctrine, flowing from the beliefs of classical republicanism that
virtue, the precondition for the success of a republic, is threatened
3 20
above all by luxury.
For whatever complex of reasons, a system of government based
on the idea that the people govern themselves, whether directly or indirectly, is fundamentally at risk if they do not take the trouble or have
the interest to exercise that right and responsibility of self-government.
Professor Kammen's book suggests that constitutional government
seems to have survived in the United States through the determined
efforts of a relatively small band of committed scholars, judges, and
public officials-abetted only at sporadic intervals by the support of an
aroused public.
We might conclude from A Machine That Would Go of Itself that the
Constitution still functions not because of its veneration by the American people but in spite of that veneration. But, read in light of Professor Ackerman's "Discovering the Constitution, ' 3 2 1 Professor
Kammen's study may instead offer support for Professor Ackerman's
two-track understanding of American politics under the Constitution.
In Professor Ackerman's model, as described earlier, 32 2 most Americans leave politics to politicians and elected officials during times of
normal politics. In times of constitutional politics, however, when the
operation of the constitutional system creates problems not resolvable
within the track of normal politics, these controversies engage the attention and the energies of the People of the United States, and a large,
complex process of debate and discussion at this higher level of analysis ultimately resolves the issue.
Nevertheless, Professor Ackerman's two-track model requires that
the people of the United States remain both able and willing to reach
the level of constitutional politics when necessary-of thinking and acting as the People of the United States in times of constitutional crisis.
319. Id. at 18 (quotingJ. Lowell, The Place of the Independent in Politics, in Polit-

ical Essays 295, 312 (1888)).
320.- Wood, supra note 3, at 52-53, 65, 108-10, 113-16, 421-24, 479, 574.
321. Ackerman, supra note 195.

322. See supra text accompanying notes 195-208.
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And the portents to be found in A M1iachine That Would Go of Itself are not
reassuring.
CONCLUSION:

HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND

CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE

One of the most haunting of Biblical tales is that of the Tower of
Babel. 3 23 The feature of that tale of concern to constitutional historians and theorists is the shattering of a world of shared discourse into a
myriad of disparate communities whose members could not understand
each other. The common human speech destroyed at Babel perished at
the hand of God. Though not of the same origin, a similar threat to the
unity of our constitutional discourse is emerging to cast a pall over the
Bicentennial and beyond.
By "constitutional discourse," I mean the continuing conversation
shared by historians, legal scholars,judges, lawyers, politicians, and the
general public about the Constitution's meaning, origins, and application. A map of that intellectual world discloses three distinct though
overlapping categories of thought, each with its corresponding method
of history: the ceremonial, whose purpose is to celebrate the Constitution's origins and success as a charter of government; the utilitarian,
whose purpose is to employ the various elements of our constitutional
heritage and system to resolve modem controversies; and the scholarly,
whose purpose is to study American history, politics, and jurisprudence
3 24
as they have shaped and have been shaped by the Constitution.
323. Genesis 11:1-9.

324. See Bernard Lewis's typology of history in B. Lewis, History: Recovered,
Remembered, Invented 11-12 (1976). A special note about the legal community's relationship to the Bicentennial is appropriate. First, the legal community is a special subset
of the audience for the ceremonial Bicentennial. In part, lawyers see the Constitution as
fitting within their peculiar province:
The freedom created by the Constitution unleashed the energies, abilities and
God-given talents of every individual to develop and prosper. We can all take
pride that so many leaders of our profession were key figures in bringing about
the miracle in Philadelphia. We lawyers, more than others, have a special responsibility as guardians of that great charter. Every bar association, local or
state, should have an active program to help give ourselves a history and a civic
lesson.
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1987, at back cover (statement of former Chief Justice Burger); see
also Conway, The President's Perspective: Plugging Mr. Madison's Cask, NJ. Law.,
Summer 1987, at 4-5. Also, they find it congenial to celebrate the Framers as lawgivers

and the making of the Constitution as the pinnacle of legal creativity and achievement.
Whatever the reason, lawyers have always taken special pride in the several anniversaries
of the Constitution, and they have valued those works which at the same time celebrate
the Constitution and pay homage to the roles of lawyers as its architects and guardians.
This is particularly true of Catherine Drinker Bowen's Viracle at Philadelphia,C. Bowen,
supra note 281, by far the most popular of such works. Ms. Bowen's book has won
special praise from former ChiefJustice Burger and other leaders of the profession, see,
e.g., Burger, Foreword, in id., at vii-viii; Conway, supra; Richman, Bookshelf (review of
C. Bowen, supra note 281), NJ. Lawyer, Summer 1987, at 47, a significant reason being
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In the period discussed in A Machine That Would Go of Itself, despite
the general public's ignorance or misunderstanding of constitutionalism and particular matters of constitutional government, these distinct
categories of thought and historical methodology supported and contributed to each other. The Bicentennial of the Constitution carries
portents far more disturbing and threatening to American constitutionalism than anything reported in Professor Kammen's study. Due in
part to the outright hostility of some Bicentennial planners to those
32 5
who do not share their conceptions of American history and values,
the process of interchange and cross-fertilization of ideas-our constitutional discourse-is breaking apart in the 1980s. Its dissolution entails the threat of severe damage to a major precondition for the
success of constitutional government: an informed and politically active citizenry.
The worst Bicentennial excesses may injure public knowledge and
appreciation of the Constitution and its central principles by trivializing
them.3 2 6 On the other hand, the best of the Bicentennial publications

on the Founding Period represent the valiant efforts of historians, legal
scholars, journalists, and other writers to preserve our shared constitutional discourse. In his introduction to one of the best new works of
popular constitutional history, Bill Moyers distills the lessons that, if we
are fortunate, the American people will absorb in this Bicentennial
period:
The Constitution was not chiseled in stone on a sacred mountain. It was talked into existence. Through the give-and-take
of debate, men who valued the meaning of words and the
its place as the capstone of her series of books glorifying key figures in the history of the
common law and by implication the law itself. Richman, supra.
The legal community also has a deep interest in recovering, elucidating, and applying the "original intent" thought to underlie constitutional provisions. This method of

constitutional interpretation ties in well with the ceremonial Bicentennial, for the veneration accruing to the Framers carries over to suffuse interpretative enterprises purporting to identify and apply their intent.
325. A recent interview with Phyllis Schlafly furnishes one example:
Q Do you think the criticisms of the [Burger] commission have been unfair?
A: I think they were put out by the intellectual types who were bent out of
shape because they were not running the bicentennial as an exercise for the
intelligencia.
I agree with Chief Justice Burger that this is a bicentennial for all Americans. We don't want it to be the private province of professors and lawyers,
and people who think they know more than the rest of us.
The Bicentennial-Hitor lliss?, A.B.A.J., Sept. 1, 1987, at 44, col. 1.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 266-79. For two representative samples,
see numerous articles and advertisements in Am. Legion Mag., Sept. 1987, passim, especially id. at 5 (American Historical Foundation Advertisement offering "Constitution
200th Commemorative .44 Magnum" handgun in two different "editions"); UFO Aliens

Helped Congress Write the Constitution, Nat'l Enquirer, undated (copy on file at the
Columbia Law Review). I am indebted to Rose Gasbarra and Nina Morais for these
references.

1624

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:1565

power of civilized discussion achieved by reason an agreement
on how free citizens could live in society and govern
themselves.
The Constitutional Convention... was a political process,
wrought by men aware of conflicting interests and finite possibilities .... Recognizing the Constitution as the product of a
political process should inspire us more than if Washington
had been Moses, taking dictation from Yahweh. If these men
got a republic started through deliberation, then certainly we
can keep it going by imagining ourselves their heirs of civil
discourse. To be sure, they were an uncommon lot. But we
still have available to us the insights and arts they brought to
politics in their day: the practical importance of history and
experience; the necessity of principled compromise; an understanding of government as a contract between rulers and
ruled; the need constantly to monitor that contract and the necessity of revising it occasionally; the value of equilibrium in
the distribution of power; a knowledge of human imperfection
and skepticism towards its perfectibility; and the importance of
civic virtue-public responsibility-in self-governance. This is
not the revealed wisdom of demigods. It is the insight of experience, the common sense that time and time again saved
the convention from ruinous deadlock. To see them as they
were takes the Founders down from those old portraits on the
wall, unfreezes them, and opens a dialogue between them and
us about what it meant then and what it means now to be an
American.
The message of that summer's labor is not dated. It still
glows with life. Politics matter. Language matters. Reason
and argument matter. We are people born of this event. The
debates
that shaped it are as relevant as the headlines of the
27
day.3
327. Moyers, Introduction to B. Moyers, supra note 285.

